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From Marriage to Households: Towards 
Equal Treatment of Intimate Forms of Life 
DEBORAH ZALESNE† & ADAM DEXTER‡ 
 When the civil magistrate sought to justify his reign, he preached 
to the people that under his rule they are free and equal: free to 
pursue their conceptions of the good life and equal under the law. 
For word of the good news to reach the people, the civil magistrate 
invited citizens from each community under his jurisdiction to hear 
him preach: Joseph, Gautama, Sarah, Aisha, Hillary, and Isa, each 
of whom was pursuing his or her own conceptions of the good life by 
choosing associations fit for them. 
 Joseph was recently wed to Mary at their church. The civil 
magistrate told him, “I approve of your union and will recognize it. 
Further, I will weigh your union as a factor when making policy so 
as to provide you benefits and protections with respect to it.” 
 Gautama lived permanently with Steve and Bob in a tantric trio 
of love and commitment. The civil magistrate told him, “I disapprove 
of your union and I will not recognize it. Further, I will not weigh 
your union as a factor when making policy and therefore will provide 
you no benefits and protections with respect to it.” 
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 Sarah was Rebecca’s sister. Together they took care of Sarah’s 
child, Ruth. The civil magistrate told her, “I disapprove of your 
union and I will not recognize it. Further, I will not weigh your union 
as a factor when making policy and therefore will provide you no 
benefits and protections with respect to it.” 
 Aisha was also a “single mother,” raising her child, Joshua, with 
her father, Ishmael (Joshua’s grandfather). The civil magistrate told 
her, “I disapprove of your union and I will not recognize it. Further, 
I will not weigh your union as a factor when making policy and 
therefore will provide you no benefits and protections with respect to 
it.” 
 Hillary sought to join Debra and Sappho as sister-wives in a 
polygamous relationship with their husband, Denis. The civil 
magistrate told her, “I disapprove of your union and I will not 
recognize it. Further, I will not weigh your union as a factor when 
making policy and therefore will provide you no benefits and 
protections with respect to it. Moreover, Hillary, I will lock you up.” 
 Isa then approached, and with an eye on the magistrate who was 
so hurtful toward Hillary, said to the citizens, “that the hypocrite 
reign not, lest the people be ensnared.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Laws and attitudes around marriage have changed 
drastically in our own history and are widely different across 
cultures. Same-sex marriage is now legal, polyamorous 
relationships are on the rise, and, as an empirical matter, 
marriage serves a different purpose than it did as little as 
forty years ago—marriage is no longer a prerequisite for 
sexual intimacy, cohabitation, or parenthood. There are no 
essential elements to a definition of marriage to which the 
State can appeal without arbitrarily restricting citizens’ 
possibilities concerning their most intimate relationships. 
Therefore, because any State-sanctioned version of marriage 
will be arbitrary, as illustrated in the introductory vignette, 
the only justified form of marriage the State can sanction is 
marriage in the form of a contract, treated like any other 
contract. 
From this premise, we propose a shift from “marriage” 
as a unique status with membership based on State 
 
 1. Job 34:30 (King James). 
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approval, to the broader notion of “household” as a contract 
with the parties themselves determining the members. 
Under this new legal approach, “households” supplant 
marriages as the atomistic factor in policymaking and social 
thinking. Households would replace marriages in receiving 
the State allocated benefits traditionally provided to married 
couples,2 but the parties themselves would define who is a 
member of the household. Unlike marriage, the notion of 
contractual household formation does not depend on a sexual 
relationship. Equal treatment of independent relationships, 
free of State-imposed membership requirements, respects 
autonomy and diversity. Household constitution is grounded 
in voluntary choice and subject to the standard contract 
defenses concerned with illusory assent. 
Adducing the endless variety of intimate relations 
throughout history and across cultures, coupled with the 
principle that citizens should be free to pursue intimate 
arrangements fit for them, we set out to justify the claim that 
formal recognition of family formation should not be limited 
to couples, but must include the freedom to pursue 
arrangements involving more than two people. The State no 
longer regulates legally recognized family relations by sex, 
gender, race, continuity, and marital property. We argue 
that the regulation of number is equally ripe for reform. 
Insofar as there is only one form of marriage, it cannot fairly 
be said that the decision to enter that marriage is a choice in 
the meaningful sense, since true choice demands alternative 
feasible arrangements. When the civil magistrate endows 
preferential treatment on one marital arrangement, the 
supreme power of the State’s coercive capacity unduly 
influences one’s choice. 
 
 2. We see a compelling argument that the State should not confer any special 
benefits based on relationship status, but should rather provide basic protections 
to all citizens. However, this Article stops short of proposing the complete 
elimination of marriage. Instead, to the extent that marriage exists, and as long 
as the State imposes obligations and grants benefits to married people, we 
propose expanding the categories of people who qualify. 
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We justify our approach on established principles of 
political liberalism and classical contract law, finding 
common trends toward openness and autonomy between the 
two traditions. A central tenet of political liberalism is State 
neutrality with respect to “the good life,” whereby the State 
provides the conditions for the actualization of human 
purposes without sanctioning one form of life over another.3 
Especially in a pluralistic society such as the United States, 
for the State to favor this or that form of life is either to 
discriminate against those who live differently or to narrow 
the range of options for citizens arbitrarily, thereby 
supplanting organic society’s variety and richness of human 
life with a prescribed homogeneity. Likewise, principles of 
contract law—autonomy, self-determination, willing 
cooperation, and consent to association—also demand an 
absence of arbitrary restrictions on private choice. 
Nonetheless, that there are three parties to the marriage 
contract, two spouses and the State, secures for the State the 
power not only to recognize, but also to design family 
relationships, promoting one way of life among many 
possibilities.4 The State legally favors traditionally married 
couples in areas as varied as tax preferences,5 evidentiary 
privileges,6 immigration status,7 medical issues,8 
 
 3. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4–6 (1993). 
 4. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) 
(noting that, “[i]n a real sense, there are three partners to every civil 
marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State”). 
 5. There are approximately fifty-nine provisions in the Federal Income Tax 
Code in which tax liability depends on marital status. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-175 TAX ADMINISTRATION: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF 
MARRIED AND SINGLE INDIVIDUALS 3 (1996). 
 6. Married spouses are entitled to both spousal immunity and privileged 
confidential marital communications under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 
FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 
enactment. 
 7. Unmarried couples do not have the ability to petition for their alien 
partner under current immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(k) (2012). 
 8. For example, married couples benefit from the Family and Medical Leave 
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government benefits such as Social Security,9 hospital 
visits,10 inheritance,11 wrongful death and loss of consortium 
actions,12 and bankruptcy protections,13 among others.14 In 
addition, neither Title VII15 nor the Fair Housing Act16 
prohibits marital status discrimination.17 The 1990s welfare 
reform particularly favored marriage and hurt unmarried 
women by incentivizing states to reduce out of wedlock 
 
Act (FMLA), which requires covered employers to grant employees up to twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave per year for the care of an immediate family member with 
a serious medical condition. While the FMLA has a broad definition of child, 
including the child of a person standing in loco parentis, the term “spouse” is 
limited to husband and wife. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12)–(13) (2012). 
 9. When no other condition applies, Social Security benefits pass to a 
surviving spouse so long as they have been married for at least nine months. 
42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (2012). 
 10. The most famous case is that of Sharon Kowalski, in which her parents 
were able to legally deny her same-sex partner guardianship and hospital 
visitation. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 11. Among other estate distribution benefits, married couples are entitled to 
a tenancy by the entirety when their partner dies, JOHN G. SPRANKLING, 
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 133 (2d ed. 2007), and benefit from a marital tax 
deduction from estate and gift taxes for all property left to a spouse. 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 2056, 2523 (2012). 
 12. Many states do not provide wrongful death standing to non-marital 
partners, and even if a state does provide such rights, the benefits are extended 
only to those who register and not to all non-marital couples. John G. Culhane, 
Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB. L. 
J. 171, 172 (2005). 
 13. A husband and wife can opt to file for bankruptcy jointly. 11 U.S.C. § 302 
(2012). 
 14. Children of married couples are also unduly privileged. Laws emanating 
from the prevailing law towards marriage generally have created classifications 
between legitimate and illegitimate children, in many cases to the detriment of 
children born to unmarried parents. For example, in immigration law, children 
born out of wedlock must establish paternity, whereas a child born in wedlock is 
presumed to be the offspring of the husband. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012). 
The presumption is yet another coercive measure pushing people toward a 
specifically designed end. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 16. Id. §§ 3601–3619. 
 17. Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 
TEMP. L. REV. 709, 790 (2002). 
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births.18 Social policy does more than “nudge” individuals 
into recognized marital relations. 
Privileging married persons with government benefits 
and special taxation treatment violates basic principles of 
political liberalism.19 With regard to family law in general, 
and the law around marriage formation in particular, two 
questions arise. First, an empirical question: Does the law 
restrict or unduly burden otherwise private, organic 
institutional conduct? And second, a normative question: If 
the law does in fact restrict such conduct, is the restricted 
conduct harmful or unjust? If not, the State is violating basic 
principles of human dignity and autonomy by interfering 
with private, free choice. We will show the State’s privileging 
of monogamous marital relations is based not on the grounds 
that alternative forms of relationships are inherently 
harmful, but rather, on parochial grounds. We propose that 
the criminalization and non-recognition of multiple marriage 
or polyamorous marital relationships is, for example, 
motivated by religious animus and “proper” Victorian ethics 
rather than legitimate state ends. 
Marriage is most fairly and justly conceived as a contract 
because the principles and values underpinning contract law 
 
 18. Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL 
THEORY 313, 317–18 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009). 
 19. See generally ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, 
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 168 (2012) (arguing that marriage should be modeled on 
friendship rather than romantic union); CLARE CHAMBERS, AGAINST MARRIAGE: 
AN EGALITARIAN DEFENCE OF THE MARRIAGE-FREE STATE (2017) (arguing that civil 
marriage violates liberal neutrality); TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: 
MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE 7 (2010) (arguing that 
civil marriage privileges some views of the good life at the expense of others); 
Jeremy R. Garrett, Marriage Unhitched from the State: A Defense, 23 PUB. AFF. 
Q. 161, 167–68 (2009) (arguing that civil marriage devalues “alternative ways of 
life, including living singly, cohabiting, and other forms of nonrecognized 
partnering.”). But see Simon Cabulea May, Liberal Neutrality and Civil 
Marriage, in AFTER MARRIAGE: RETHINKING MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 9 (Elizabeth 
Brake ed., 2016) [hereinafter AFTER MARRIAGE] (offering a defense of marriage as 
compatible with liberalism); Ralph Wedgwood, Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?, in 
AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 29 (offering a defense of marriage as 
compatible with liberalism). 
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are borrowed from a more general conception of a free human 
being.20 The formalization of intimate relations and family 
formation is so central to one’s identity that general 
principles of human freedom are replaced by parochial 
institutional conceptions of “proper” conduct only at the price 
of selling short human dignity and autonomy. A just 
spectrum correlates the degree of autonomy warranted with 
the strength of the privacy claim. 
Those critical of contract as panacea might argue that, 
because women contract from an already subordinated 
position, modern patriarchy is legitimized through 
contract,21 and therefore our contractual paradigmatic 
method is naïve. Carole Pateman argues in the influential 
Sexual Contract, for example, that “for marriage to become 
merely a contract of sexual use . . . would mark the political 
defeat of women as women.”22 Such criticism, however, is 
rendered moot when we decouple marriage from sexuality 
entirely and take the household as the central unit, 
permitting associations of women, associations of men, 
mixed polyamorous arrangements, and even modern 
polygamy. The end of marital rape exceptions, the existence 
of which Pateman heavily relies on for her claim that civil 
contract secures male sex-right, was the first step in de-
coupling sexuality from marriage.23 We have many more 
steps ahead. 
 
 20. Others have argued for the abolition of marriage as a legal category and 
promoted the use of contract instead. See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–30 
(1995). See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, 
LOVERS AND THE LAW 255–333 (1981). 
 21. E.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2 (1988). 
 22. Id. at 187. For Pateman, the correspondence of “man” with “individual” is 
so embedded in our political and legal culture that to make a “woman” an 
individual is to make women like men, thereby denying concrete sexual 
difference. Pateman argues the social contract the “canonical” theorists 
hypothesized included, in addition to the creation of civil society among men, the 
transformation of man’s “natural right over women into the security of civil 
patriarchal right.” Id. at 6. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
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Polygamy is one feasible alternative to monogamy that 
tests our allegiance to basic principles of liberalism and 
classical contract law.24 It is true that historically, 
polygamous relationships have been characterized by 
exploitation and oppression of women, and that the practice 
of polygamy often coincides with crimes targeting women 
and children, such as incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, 
and failure to pay child support.25 But inequality within the 
household and oppressive patriarchal forces are not inherent 
to polygamy any more than exploitation of workers is 
inherent to a free market. Just as pre-existing inequalities, 
concentrated wealth, and competing job applicants with little 
bargaining power create the conditions for the exploitation of 
workers, patriarchal ideology, religious fanaticism, laws and 
norms limiting the education and professionalization of 
women, and economic dependence on men create the 
conditions for exploitation of women in polygamous (and 
monogamous) marriage.26 Proper polygamy—the right to 
marry multiple, consenting, age-appropriate partners of 
whatever gender—is not inherently harmful or unjust. 
 
 24. A variety of other scholars have argued for state recognition of polygamy. 
See, e.g., Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for 
Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1023 (2005); Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in 
America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2014) (setting out “a regulatory 
scheme that not only legalizes polygamy, but also develops regulatory rules to 
ensure consent, prevent unequal bargaining power between the parties, and 
protect individual rights”); Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy? 
Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification, 8 J. 
MORAL PHIL. 246 (2011); Peter de Marneffe, Liberty and Polygamy, in AFTER 
MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 125 (arguing that although polygamy should not be 
legally recognized, it should nonetheless be decriminalized); Laurie Shrage, 
Polygamy, Privacy, and Equality, in AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 160 
(arguing that problems of oppression posed by polygamy are no different from 
those posed by monogamy, and making the case for egalitarian polygamy and 
bigamy). 
 25. See generally Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate 
Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in 
Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
225, 239–45 (2001). 
 26. See infra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
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Traditionally oppressive forms of polygamy have no bearing 
on the issue of whether, within the liberal paradigm, 
polygamy as such is morally permissible and whether it 
should be legally so. Americans’ immediate associations of 
polygamy with the other race of people or the other religion 
are cause for initial skepticism of our intuitions about what 
is unjust or harmful. 
Important clarifications help specify the nature of our 
argument. First, we are not arguing that a world with more 
multiple marriage is preferable to a world with less; rather, 
we argue for the moral and legal permissibility27 of various 
household arrangements for the sake of actual adherence to 
principles of liberalism and classical contract law. Other 
arrangements deserving of equal State treatment include 
nonsexual partnerships, temporary marriages, polyamorous 
arrangements, co-habiting couples, and multi-generational 
cohabitation, such as a mother and grandmother raising a 
child, among others—all equally “households.” We make the 
larger claim that the law around marriage should be 
reformed so as to better resemble the classical contract 
paradigm, permitting the parties to contract for whatever 
arrangements that are both fit for them and morally 
permissible. Our preoccupation with State neutrality is 
based on the fundamental principle of justice as fairness. 
Second, monogamy, polygamy, and polyamory28 are 
normatively idealized forms of life debased by their 
 
 27. Moral theory generally consists of three categories: (1) moral; (2) immoral; 
and (3) morally permissible. ANNE THOMSON, CRITICAL REASONING IN ETHICS: A 
PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION 12 (1999). For instance, when walking by a pond and 
seeing a drowning child, the moral course of action would be to help the child and 
the immoral course of action would be to ignore the child. But what is the moral 
status of the choice to sing the song Hero, written by Enrique Iglesias (2001), 
while saving the child? Doing so would be neither moral nor immoral. Singing 
would neither help nor hurt the child nor anyone else. Thus, singing Hero while 
saving the child would be merely morally permissible. Id. 
 28. Polyamory is the practice of having ongoing intimate and/or romantic 
relationships with more than one person, whether independent relationships or 
unions of three or more people. Ann Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1479 (2011). 
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corresponding actual practices. Christianity and Islam are 
also normatively idealized forms of life, as are republicanism 
and democracy. All have meanings inherently contested by 
their participants but mean in each case that form of life for 
which human beings may choose to strive to achieve. Just as 
specific instances of “Islamic terrorism” or repressive 
theocracy do not condemn Islam, specific examples of 
patriarchal polygamous practices do not condemn multiple 
marriage as such. 
Thus informed by the virtues and vision of political 
liberalism and freedom of contract, we propose two general 
principles of law around marriage or civil unions. The first 
principle is that the state should involve itself no further in 
family formation than to enforce private contractual 
arrangements made on the basis of meaningful choice. 
“Meaningful choice” here means the free pursuit of one 
option among conceived feasible alternatives. That is, a 
choice is only a choice if other options are available. The 
second principle is that in the area of family law, the law 
should accommodate organic society’s spontaneous forms 
rather than the other way around. Here, abstract 
conceptions of marriage are often at odds with the reality. 
Some features of current marriage law have become 
anachronistic oddities given the current state of society, 
especially considering the progress made on women’s 
rights.29 The law should follow the cultural shift away from 
 
 29. As examples, marital property is the lingering effect of coverture and the 
reluctance of law enforcement to effectively criminalize abuse within the family 
is a lingering effect of marital rape exemptions. Relatedly, continued income gaps 
between men and women are the lingering effect of assumed gender roles within 
the family where the husband concerns himself with the public sphere and the 
wife with the private sphere, even though more women are graduating from 
college with professional degrees than ever. See INSTITUTE OF EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES: NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DEGREES CONFERRED BY 
DEGREE-GRANTING POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, BY LEVEL OF DEGREE AND SEX OF 
STUDENT (2013), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13 _318.10.asp 
(reporting that in 2012, 57.3% of those who graduated with a bachelor’s degree 
were women as compared to 55.1% in 1995; and 59.9% of those who earned a 
master’s degree were women in 2012 as compared to 55.5% in 1995). 
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marriage and toward family formations as varied as single 
parenthood, romantic cohabitation without marriage, and 
polyamory. 
The circularity of the claim that marriage should be 
between two persons because marriage is defined as 
consisting of two people should be clear. What is the source 
of the definition? Can anything but tradition and prejudice 
make it ostensibly legitimate? Arguments on both sides, that 
evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology produce 
evidence that monogamy is either, for the most part, 
“natural”30 or “unnatural,”31 commit the naturalistic fallacy32 
and hardly factor into our analysis. 
Here, similarly, we seek to de-naturalize and impregnate 
with possibility the idea of “marriage” to the point that it is 
more precisely called a household. While traditional 
marriage will likely remain popular, the broader notion of 
households justly and fairly accommodates the endless 
variety of morally permissible family forms determined by 
the participants. 
Accordingly, based on overlapping principles of political 
liberalism and classical contract law, Part I asserts that the 
State should not be involved with family formation other 
than to enforce private contracts. This Section surveys the 
long history of the State’s unjustified intrusion into the 
institution of marriage as well as current trends related to 
marriage and polygamy, highlighting the importance of 
State neutrality and the need for reform. Part II then 
proposes a shift from marriage as a status to household as a 
contract. As a model, we look to the law of business 
partnerships, which does not limit the number of 
participants but allows the business relationship to be 
 
 30. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 59 (1994). 
 31. CHRISTOPHER RYAN & CACILDA JETHÁ, SEX AT DAWN: THE PREHISTORIC 
ORIGINS OF MODERN SEXUALITY 46 (2010). 
 32. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 331–37 (David Fate Norton 
& Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739). 
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defined largely by the parties themselves. 
Arguably, the greatest virtue of the United States is the 
slow but steady trend toward openness and tolerance. The 
trend does not skip over marriage law. From coverture to 
marital property to no fault divorce to gay marriage and 
cohabitation, we see a line of progress far from its finale. Just 
as our society has been made more just by the expansion of 
the concept of “citizen,” so too will the expansion of the 
concept of marriage serve the ends of a just society. This is 
so, even if the multi-cultural window is opened to family 
forms as objectionable to some as disagreeable speech 
protected by the First Amendment, and even if one day 
expanded to the point of abolition. 
 
I. POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW: 
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN FAMILY FORMATION 
Spanning the tradition of political liberalism from the 
seventeenth century until today is the presumption that the 
state must sustain the conditions for actualizing the widest 
feasible array of conceptions of the good life, ways of being in 
the world, and life projects that do not infringe the rights of 
others.33 In other words, freedom and reciprocity go hand-in-
hand. Freedom for one presupposes freedom for all. Rawls, 
for instance, theorizes the “reasonable” citizen “ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation 
and to abide by them willingly given the assurance that 
others will likewise do so.”34 Political liberalism, then, sees 
the State as neutral with regard to the good life and what 
people value; as a socio-historical fact, the United States is 
so large, complex, and diverse that empirically there can be 
 
 33. DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789 [DECLARATION 
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 1789]; JOHN STUART MILL, THE 
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 8–11 (1869).  
 34. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 49. 
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no consensus on these matters.35 The law should not restrict 
or unduly burden otherwise private, organic institutional 
conduct unless the restricted conduct is harmful or unjust. If 
the potential harm is merely speculative, interference is not 
warranted, especially where there is a strong countervailing 
policy that furthers the good life. 
It is likewise a fundamental principle of classical 
contract law that individuals should be free to set their own 
contact terms and to engage in free exchange of goods and 
services, without interference from the government.36 This 
rule reflects the belief that individual choice and autonomy 
are fundamental to human life, and courts should not impose 
upon the parties their own views regarding the value of goods 
and services exchanged, as long as the contracting parties 
voluntarily and freely assented to such terms.37 
Marriage and family formation illustrate the value of the 
principles of individual autonomy and State neutrality. 
Without neutrality, there is great risk that such a 
fundamentally basic organizing principle for living as 
household formation would be subordinated to governmental 
social and economic interests: dis-incentivizing single 
motherhood because of the “drain” on public services or 
criminalizing polygamy because of the myth of a “Judeo-
Christian” foundation to our laws, for instance. 
With respect to marriage and intimate relationships, 
social experience strongly suggests that people will desire 
different and varied types of intimate relationships and 
forums for raising their children, or abstain from defined 
 
 35. Id. at 36 (stating that “the diversity of reasonable comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic 
societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a 
permanent feature of the public culture of democracy”). 
 36. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) (claiming that 
individual autonomy is a central precondition to individual freedom); MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (claiming that individual autonomy 
is seen as a paramount social value). 
 37. FRIED, supra note 36; FRIEDMAN, supra note 36. 
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relationships altogether. In fact, in a pluralistic, open, and 
liberal society such as ours, we should expect people to 
choose to commit to relationships that many of us find 
counterintuitive because human beings are animals with 
feelings, not rational wealth-maximizers. Thus, we can 
reasonably expect the variety of rich human characteristics 
and experiences that critics of plural marriage fear will be 
lost due to the specter of resurgent religious control over 
family formation. Further, we can reasonably expect some 
people to reject the notion that monogamy is always a good 
thing.38 
Despite the rich variety of human conceptions of the good 
life with respect to relationships, the State privileges 
monogamous dyads by granting vast economic and legal 
benefits to couples that register their relationships with the 
State39 (while generally staying neutral regarding other 
forms of caring relationships—implicitly devaluing those 
other non-privileged relationships). Judicial opinions at all 
levels extol the virtues of monogamous matrimony and the 
dangers of alternative household formations (often 
celebrating marriage in a way that exposes religious 
influence), and the State has explicitly regulated and 
criminalized polygamy, a type of personal relationship 
arrangement that it has deemed to be against public policy.40 
Particularly analyzed as coupled together, by privileging one 
form of life while criminalizing another, the State, in the area 
of law around marriage, clearly and obviously violates the 
principle of neutrality. 
In this Section we set out to show the State’s regulation 
 
 38. See Isiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 
169–70 (1970) (explaining that humans choose between ultimate values); RYAN 
& JETHÁ, supra note 31, at 5 (2010) (noting that “[t]he frantic sexual hypocrisy in 
America is inexplicable if we adhere to traditional models of human sexuality 
insisting that monogamy is natural, marriage is a human universal, and any 
family structure other than the nuclear is aberrant”). 
 39. See supra notes 5–14 and accompanying text. 
 40. See generally infra Section II.A.1.b. 
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of marriage arbitrarily restricts conduct by narrowing the 
range of legal, feasible, and therefore conceivable family 
formations. The key word here is “arbitrary.” Criminal law 
seeks to prohibit conduct and narrow the range of human 
possibility non-arbitrarily, because to do otherwise would 
risk clearly identifiable harms. The State’s justifications for 
restricting marriage to dyads are arbitrary in that “the 
stable family” masks residual puritanism, and “the best 
interests of children” masks the intent to rationalize hetero-
normativity, as it was during the “gay marriage debate.” In 
each case, appeals to social prejudices with ostensibly 
neutral language are the means by which democratic 
processes favor one way of life over another. 
Section A surveys the long history of State interference 
with private relationships through a vast array of laws and 
regulations providing economic and legal benefits to those 
who marry, and criminalizing marriage among more than 
two people. Section A then looks at current trends 
surrounding marriage, highlighting the existing illusion of 
liberal progress. Although there is no longer coverture and 
there are no longer marital rape exemptions, problems such 
as domestic violence and gendered marital roles remain. This 
Section then explains why such State interference is 
unjustified and sets out the need for State neutrality. The 
overarching themes here are the State’s unjustified narrow 
conception of marriage and its intrusion into personal, 
intimate relations. 
Section B proposes the idea of marriage as a private 
institution, which would grant participants autonomy to 
make individual choices based on their unique individual 
needs and desires. In this Section we ultimately set out to 
show why the various other unprivileged intimate 
relationships, such as polygamy and polyamory, are not 
inherently harmful, and should be offered as meaningful 
alternatives to traditional two-person monogamous 
marriage. Here, the overarching themes are, as opposed to 
unjustified essentialism and intrusion, a justified approach 
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based on established contract law principles and an openness 
to forms of life. 
A. Marriage in the Liberal State 
The State has a long history of regulating marriage in 
order to promote its financial interests and an equally long 
history in prohibiting polygamy in order to promote sexual 
behavioral norms and the “best interests” of women and 
children. The State endorses one form among feasible 
alternative matrimonial ideals, advancing “matrimony as an 
ideal type of personal relationship.”41 By promoting civil 
marriage, the State endorses one conception of the good life, 
advancing the view that civil marriage gives meaning and 
value to life and is superior to other types of relationships. In 
doing so, the State “ignores alternative ideals of 
relationship[:] . . . close dyadic friendships, small group 
family units, or networks of multiple, significant 
nonexclusive relationships that provide emotional support, 
caretaking, and intimacy,”42 not to mention living singly. The 
prevailing legal approach is unjustified in confusing the 
parochial for the universal and violating the principle of 
neutrality. It is also exclusive in that marital terms accord to 
a particular image of the good life and deny formal 
recognition to feasible alternative arrangements. 
1. Illiberal History of State Interference in Marriage and 
Preference for Monogamy 
a. Marriage 
A genealogical approach to understanding marriage’s 
role in society opens a window to a clearer view of how social 
norms and public policy have restricted feasible alternative 
family forms and trapped individuals into a single, 
normatively idealized form of life. Some of these same 
 
 41. Cabulea May, supra note 19, at 9. 
 42. BRAKE, supra note 19, at 168. See supra notes 5–14 and accompanying 
text. 
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individuals, under a more open legal regime, may have lived 
differently—an injustice of no small measure. The injustice 
is magnified when considering the injustices historically 
associated with the State-sanctioned monopolistic 
monogamous marriage. 
Historically, patriarchy has used marriage to deny 
women liberally conceived rights and personhood with 
reference to men, or rather “public society.”43 A free woman’s 
legal rights depended on her marital status;44 single women 
had more rights than married women at common law.45 As 
long as a woman remained unmarried she could enter into 
contracts, buy and sell real estate, and accumulate personal 
property, which included cash, stocks, and livestock.46 An 
unmarried woman could also sue or be sued, write wills, and 
act as an executor of an estate.47 Under the common law 
system of coverture, once married, a woman lost her 
autonomy and was subsumed under her husband’s 
identity.48 The husband acquired an estate in the wife’s real 
property for the duration of the marriage and he was entitled 
to sole possession and control of any property that the wife 
owned.49 
At common law the husband also enjoyed substantial 
 
 43. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha 
Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 167, 170 (1999). 
 44. Enslaved black women were not allowed to marry, have custody of 
children, own property, control their bodies, or earn money from their labor. 
Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 307–11 (2006). 
 45. Yvette Joy Liebesman, No Guarantees: Lessons from the Property Rights 
Gained and Lost by Married Women in Two American Colonies, 27 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 181, 183–87 (2006). 
 46. Id. at 183–84. 
 47. Id. at 183. 
 48. Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346, 347 (1979). See also Bradwell 
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 49. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal 
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1661 (2003). 
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rights over the body of his wife. Husbands were allowed to 
punish their wives physically as long as the corporal 
punishment did not cause permanent injury.50 Husbands 
were also legally permitted to restrict their wives’ 
movements; rape their wives; physically restrain wives from 
leaving the household; force them to come back to the 
household if they left; and conclusively determine where the 
couple would reside.51 
Until the late twentieth century, marital rape exemption 
laws—laws that allowed husbands to brutally rape their 
wives without fear of prosecution52—existed under the 
statutory law of every state and the common law.53 These 
laws were justified by the idea that there was a “marital 
right” to sexual intercourse that wives irrevocably consented 
to upon marriage.54 Further, since wives were considered the 
property of their husbands and since their identities merged 
upon marriage, rape was impossible—at best it was a crime 
against the husband’s property interest.55 The State was 
thought to have no right to legislate the private relationships 
between husband and wife.56 Furthermore, for the majority 
of our country’s history, “a husband’s use of physical violence 
to exert power and control over his wife was not 
conceptualized as domestic violence.”57 In fact, “[before] 
1970, the term ‘domestic violence’ referred to ghetto riots and 
urban terrorism, not the abuse of women by their intimate 
 
 50. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2000). 
 51. Id. at 1390–92. 
 52. Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to 
Keep Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2011). 
 53. See id. at 1819. 
 54. Id. at 1825. 
 55. Id. at 1826. 
 56. Id. at 1826–27. 
 57. Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of 
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 31, 32 (2009). 
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partners.”58 Many of the same beliefs that supported the 
justification for marital rape exemption laws also justified a 
husband’s entitlement “to correct [his wife’s] behavior as he 
would that of a servant or child.”59 
The history of marriage before the latter part of the 
twentieth century is an important factor in the evaluation of 
claims that in virtue of polygamy or co-habitation, or 
polyamorous unions, patriarchy will reign. Feminism, 
secularization, and the trend toward tolerance mitigated the 
harsh effects of monogamous marriage, as it will other 
arrangements, including polygamy, insofar as people will 
voluntarily choose it. 
b. The Monogamy Monopoly 
The State has demonstrated an unfair preference for 
monogamy, one feasible form of life among others. As an 
example, consider the history of the law of polygamy. The 
history of State animus toward and criminalization of 
polygamy is also long. Polygamy is one of six important 
historical bars to civil marriage in the United States: (1) 
during the period of slavery in the United States, marriage 
between slaves, though informally celebrated, was not 
legally recognized; (2) historically marriage across racial 
lines was barred; (3) until recently, same-sex marriage was 
not legally recognized; (4) incest or family marriage is barred 
in every state in some form;60 (5) marriage of minors is not 
recognized; and (6) polygamous marriages are not legal.61 Of 
those, incest, age, and polygamy are the only bars to 
 
 58. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of 
Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 155 (2004) 
(citing Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: 
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1290 n.42 
(2000)). 
 59. Sack, supra note 57, at 33. 
 60. Harvard Law Review Association, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest 
Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465 (2006). 
 61. Calhoun, supra note 24, at 1024. 
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marriage that remain.62 
In response to the Mormon practice of plural marriage in 
the Utah Territory,63 the federal government first began to 
regulate polygamous marriage in 1862, with the Morrill 
Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862,64 making bigamy (defined as “when 
a person with a living husband or wife marries another 
person”65) a federal offense. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, 
however, did little to curtail bigamy, since “Mormon juries 
refused to convict their peers.”66 Even so, anti-polygamy 
sentiment in the rest of the country was high, and the federal 
government persisted in making life difficult for polygamists. 
This continued attention paid to anti-polygamy efforts by the 
federal government ultimately resulted in a legal challenge 
to the law by Mormon leaders. 
 In 1878, in Reynolds v. United States,67 the Supreme 
Court held that polygamy was not protected under the Free 
 
 62. We justify permitting polygamous marriage while rejecting incestuous 
matrimony and marriage of minors based on the proven identifiable harms to 
incestuously born children and the emotional and intellectual incapacity of 
minors. However, our proposal embraces sibling partnerships and inter-
generational households and does not rule out arrangements between siblings 
and cousins not intended to result in parenthood. The precise solution to the age 
and incest issues is beyond the scope of this paper’s broad proposal for a 
paradigmatic shift in the law. 
 63. Though the primary targets of American polygamy laws have been 
Mormon populations, some Native Americans communities also engage in the 
practice of polygamy, but their tribal marriage practices supersede state law. See 
Hallowell v. Commons, 210 F. 793, 800 (8th Cir. 1914) (holding that “a different 
rule prevails with reference to the marriages of Indians, who are members of a 
tribe recognized and treated with as such by the United States government; for 
it has always been the policy of the general government to permit the Indian 
tribes as such to regulate their own domestic affairs, and to -control the 
intercourse between the sexes by their own customs and usages,” even if in 
conflict with state law). 
 64. Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862). 
 65. Ashley E. Morin, Use It or Lose It: The Enforcement of Polygamy Laws in 
America, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 497, 502 (2014). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
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Exercise Clause,68 explaining that “[l]aws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with 
mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.” 
The Reynolds decision “galvanized the anti-polygamy 
movement further,” causing “reformers of all kinds—
women’s rights advocates, educators, church leaders, 
politicians, presidential platforms, state legislatures, the 
Supreme Court, and the American Congress—[to] harshly 
condemn[] polygamy.”69 In 1882, Congress passed the 
Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act,70 which reinforced the Morrill 
Anti-Bigamy Act by adding several provisions to help enforce 
polygamy prohibition. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act 
prohibited bigamous cohabitation, thus removing the need to 
prove that actual marriages had occurred.71 The Act also 
stated that anyone who believed in bigamy was unfit to serve 
as a juror or hold public office.72 These additions ultimately 
increased the number of indictments.73 
After these crackdowns on polygamy, “Mormons 
continued to fight federal laws aimed at curtailing polygamy, 
but they were largely unsuccessful.”74 Ultimately, in 1890, in 
The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints v. United States,75 the Supreme Court upheld the 
Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act and disincorporated the Latter 
Day Saints (LDS) Church. At this point, the Mormon Church 
appeared to reject polygamy, but many Mormons continued 
to practice it. But when the Church threatened to 
excommunicate polygamists in the 1930s, the “vast majority” 
 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 69. Morin, supra note 65, at 503–04 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 70. Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882, Pub L. No. 47-47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882). 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Morin, supra note 65, at 504. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 136 U.S. 1, 64–66 (1890). 
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of Mormons finally abandoned the practice.76 There 
remained, however, a small group of Mormons who 
continued to practice polygamy. These fundamentalists “do 
not believe the Church of Latter-day Saints had the 
authority to issue a manifesto in 1890 banning plural 
unions” and that “if an ‘eternal principle’ was valid at one 
time it was valid for all times.”77 Accordingly, these 
fundamentalist communities continue today to practice 
polygamy, as a “fundamental tenet of the Mormon faith.”78 
Today, although polygamy remains illegal in all fifty 
states, laws proscribing polygamy are rarely enforced—other 
than the prosecution of a few infamous fundamentalist 
leaders.79 The lack of rigid enforcement does not discount the 
fact that the history of the criminalization of polygamy has 
influenced public opinion; state criminalization statutes 
remain popular. Polygamy has been widely viewed as 
 
 76. The LDS Church has asserted that it has no interest in reinstituting the 
practice of polygamy, having recently conceded in a brief to the United States 
Supreme Court that “[t]he question of plural marriage, of course, was addressed 
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).” Brief of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at n.11, 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074). In that brief, the LDS 
church reiterated that “[t]he practice of plural marriage was abandoned by the 
Church in 1890, and in filing this amicus brief the Church has no interest in 
revisiting this issue,” and explained that stories about Mormon polygamy in the 
media were generally about “splinter groups” that had left the church. Id. 
 77. Morin, supra note 65, at 504. 
 78. Id. 
 79. The lack of law enforcement raises questions about the criminal status of 
the practice: 
[b]y disregarding and selectively enforcing polygamy laws, state 
governments are failing to advance the purported protective goals of 
polygamy legislation and negating the purpose of the laws, while 
also restraining law-abiding citizens from entering into the practice.[] 
Thus, the current state of polygamy legislation operates in an illogical 
middle ground and undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system. 
Morin, supra note 65, at 500–01. There is an argument to be made that in light 
of the lack of enforcement, polygamous relationships should be decriminalized, if 
only to legitimize the criminal justice system. Id. 
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morally inferior by a majority of the world: 
Most Americans still view polygamy as something nefarious, much 
like slavery, its “twin.” In a Gallup Poll taken in May 2003, just one 
month prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
overturning that state’s ban on same-sex sodomy, ninety-two 
percent of adults surveyed nationwide considered “polygamy, when 
one husband has more than one wife at the same time” —or, more 
precisely, polygyny—to be “morally wrong.”80 
Despite ever-increasing divorce rates, monogamous 
marriage is “the preferred—even legally and socially 
mandated—marital lifestyle in so much of the modern 
world[.]”81 Monogamous marriage was initially and 
historically based primarily on economic conditions,82 
meeting financial needs of couples (and women in particular) 
and meeting the parenting needs of families. Monogamy is 
also thought to reduce male reproductive competition and 
suppress intra-sexual competition among men for brides, 
which shrinks the size of the pool of low-status, risk-oriented, 
unmarried men.83 The result is lower rates of crime 
(including rape, murder, assault, and robbery) and personal 
abuse.84 On the flip side, there is thought to be “greater 
parental investment (especially male), economic productivity 
([GDP per capita]), and female equality.”85 By increasing the 
relatedness within the household, monogamy may also 
reduce intra-household conflict, leading to lower rates of 
 
 80. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong, 
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 104 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 81. DAVID P. BARASH, OUT OF EDEN 109 (2016). 
 82. Id. at 121. 
 83. Joseph Henrich et al., The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage, 367 ROYAL 
SOCIETY PUBL’G 657, 658 (2012). See also DAVID M. BUSS, THE HANDBOOK OF 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 427–439 (2d ed. 2015); June Carbone, 
Understanding the Biological Basis of Commitment: Does One Size Fit All?, 25 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 179, 181 (2004); Patrick Coleman, Blame Monogamy for 
Male Infertility, FATHERLY (Apr. 19, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://www. 
fatherly.com/health-science/blame-monogamy-for -male-infertility/. 
 84. Henrich, supra note 83, at 658. 
 85. Id. 
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child neglect, accidental death, and homicide.86 
While monogamous marriage is often idealized, the 
undeniable religiously-grounded history frequently appealed 
to by courts,87 legislatures,88 and executives,89 contributes to 
the current framing of monogamy as valuable for its own 
sake, independent of context and the participants. For 
example, Christian values promote sexual fidelity, lifelong 
marriage, and parenthood, and the belief that cohabitation, 
premarital sex, divorce, unwed motherhood, and abortion are 
immoral behaviors is fundamental to many Western 
religions.90 
It is not unusual for politicians to invoke God in their 
defense of traditional monogamous marriage. In 2006, for 
example, Mike Pence, as head of the Republican Study 
Committee, supported a constitutional amendment that 
would have defined marriage as between a man and a woman 
and stated that “societal collapse was always brought about 
following an advent of the deterioration of marriage and 
family.”91 He went on to say that keeping gay people from 
marrying was not discrimination, “but an enforcement of 
‘God’s idea.’”92 Mike Huckabee, the 44th Governor of 
 
 86. Id. at 657. 
 87. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 88. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 89. See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 90. See, e.g., Dave Miller, The Sacredness of Marriage, APOLOGETICS PRESS, 
https://www.apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=7&article=1237 (last 
visited May 21, 2017) (arguing that “the breakdown of the traditional two-parent, 
biological husband-wife family is a major factor contributing to the overall moral, 
religious, and ethical decline of our country”); see also Daniel B. Gallagher, The 
Sacredness of Marriage: A Lesson from the Pagans, CRISIS MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 
2016), http://www.crisismagazine.com/2016/the-sacredness-of-marriage-a-
lesson-from-the-pagans (putting forward the idea that “marriage between a man 
and a woman, and indeed monogamy itself, are contained in the natural law”). 
 91. Will Drabold, Here’s What Mike Pence Said on LGBT Issues Over the 
Years, TIME (Jul. 15, 2016) http://time.com/4406337/mike-pence-gay-rights-lgbt-
religious-freedom/. 
 92. Id. 
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Arkansas, stated that “[f]or me… [marriage equality] is not 
just a political issue. It is a biblical issue.”93 Randy Weber, a 
United States congressman from Texas, even wept at a 
prayer event in Washington, D.C. as he begged God to forgive 
the United States for legalizing same-sex marriage. He 
exclaimed, “[f]ather, we’ve trampled on your holy institution 
of holy matrimony and tried to rewrite what it is and we’ve 
called it an alternate lifestyle. . . father, oh father, please 
forgive us.”94 
Legislatures also invoke God to justify their polygamy 
legislation. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act,95 The Edmunds 
Anti-Polygamy Act,96 and the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 188797 
all have religious foundations. For example, the legislative 
history of the Edmunds Tucker Act includes President 
Grover Cleveland’s emotional discussion of the issue of 
polygamy: 
The Strength, the perpetuity, and the destiny of the nation rest 
upon our homes, established by the law of God, guarded by parental 
care, regulated by parental authority, and sanctified by parental 
love. These are not homes of polygamy. The mothers of our land, 
who rule the nation as they mold the characters and guide the 
actions of their sons, live according to God’s holy ordinances, and 
each, secure and happy in the exclusive love of the father of her 
children, sheds the warm light of true womanhood, unperverted and 
unpolluted, upon all within her pure and wholesome family circle. 
These are not the cheerless, crushed, and unwomanly mothers of 
polygamy. . . . There is no feature of this practice or the system 
which sanctions it which is not opposed to all that is of value in our 
 
 93. Bethany Grace Howe, If Not God’s Authority, Whose? Where Did Marriage 
Come From, HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 5, 2015, 10:12 AM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/raina-bowe/if-not-gods-authority-who_b_8090588.html. 
 94. Curtis M. Wong, GOP Congressman Wept as He Begged God to Forgive 
U.S. for Marriage Equality, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2017, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/randy-weber-marriage-equality_us_59023 
d75e4b05c39767d0722. 
 95. Pub. L. No. 37-126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862). 
 96. Pub. L. No. 47-47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882). 
 97. Pub. L. No. 49- 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887). 
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institutions.98 
Pervasive views of monogamous, two-person marriage as 
“noble” and “sacred” can also be seen in most of the United 
States Supreme Court’s notable marriage cases. For 
instance, the 1888 United States Supreme Court called 
monogamous marriage “the most important relation in life” 
and “the foundation of the family and of society, without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”99 In 
the mid-twentieth century, the Court opined that marriage 
is: 
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is 
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.100 
Most recently, the 2015 Court, granting same-sex 
couples the right to marry, reasoned, “[t]he nature of 
marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons 
together can find other freedoms, such as expression, 
intimacy, and spirituality.”101 The Court opined: 
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of 
human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The 
lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility 
and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. 
Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers 
unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. 
Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found 
alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. 
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to 
our most profound hopes and aspirations.102 
The Obergefell Court’s rhetoric about the sacredness of 
 
 98. 17 CONG. REC. 109, 119 (1886). 
 99. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). 
 100. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 101. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 102. Id. at 2593–94. 
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marriage is high oratory hewing a huge hypocrisy, 
considering that this same sovereign body would quickly 
uphold criminal sanctions against Hillary’s decision to accept 
Sappho’s wish to be a “sister-wife” or prosecute anti-bigamy 
laws against Steve for intending to formalize his tantric trio 
with Gautauma and Bob.103 Such rhetoric is especially 
hypocritical in that the unions this Court would not sanction 
simply seek fulfillment outside of the so-called “unique 
fulfillment” offered by a particular, though historically-
rooted, conception of the good life and right way to live. 
The particular conception of the good life and right way 
to live favored by the State parallels historical social 
prejudices. While marriage is seen as sacred, intimate 
relationships not culminating in marriage have historically 
been seen as “illicit”104 or “meretricious,”105 with participants 
thought to be “living in sin.” This phrase, popularly 
associated with the attitude of the church, arises from the 
outdated idea that legal marriage is a prerequisite for 
conjugal relationships—and that conjugal relationships 
 
 103. See supra introductory vignette. 
 104. Illicit cohabitation is “an offense committed by an unmarried man and 
woman who live together as husband and wife and engage in sexual intercourse.” 
Illicit Cohabitation Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/illicit-cohabitation/ (last visited July 8, 2018). 
Though this offense does not exist in most states any more, and where it does, it 
is rarely prosecuted, the term is still sometimes used to refer to a couple who are 
not married to one another but “live together in circumstances that make the 
arrangement questionable on grounds of social propriety.” Id. Illicit cohabitation 
is still sometimes a crime “when [it] amounts to public immorality and public 
scandal.” Id. 
 105. A meretricious relationship is generally defined as a cohabitation that is 
marital in nature but not on paper. Meretricious relationship, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). When a former spouse and new partner live together 
without getting married, for example, their relationship is meretricious, and can 
affect the former spouse’s legal rights with respect to alimony and child support. 
Generally, such a term has been used negatively to indicate a former spouse is 
“living in sin.” Courts have historically disfavored private contractual 
alternatives to marriage, finding them contrary to public policy. 2 HOWARD O. 
HUNTER & KEITH A. ROWLEY, Cases Rejecting Marvin Approach, in MODERN LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 24:8 (rev. ed. 2011) (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 
1979)). 
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outside of marriage are sinful. For just one example, Got 
Questions Ministries, a Christian website that answers Bible 
questions, answered the question about whether living 
together before marriage is considered living in sin in this 
way: 
Since the only form of lawful sexuality is the marriage of one man 
and one woman (Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5), then anything 
outside of marriage, whether it is adultery, premarital sex, 
homosexuality, or anything else, is unlawful, in other words, sin. 
Living together before marriage definitely falls into the category of 
fornication—sexual sin.106 
The religious framing of marriage unduly influences 
judicial policy outside of polygamy as well. For example, 
meretricious agreements, or private agreements governing 
non-marital sexual relationships, are still viewed by some 
courts as against public policy.107 Particularly where the 
parties to a contract are a gay or lesbian couple, or an 
unmarried, cohabitating heterosexual couple, moral and 
social judgments about sexuality and loose sexual behavior 
can influence the court’s analysis of the contractual issue at 
hand. Similarly, most courts do not view meretricious 
relationships the same way as marriage when it comes to the 
distribution of marital property. In Washington State, for 
example, laws involving distribution of marital property do 
not apply directly to division of property following a 
meretricious relationship (though courts may look to these 
laws for guidance).108 
Not surprisingly, then, adultery, which violates the 
 
 106. Why is living together before marriage considered living in sin?, GOT 
QUESTIONS, https://www.gotquestions.org/living-in-sin.html (last visited July 8, 
2018). 
 107. Though post-Marvin contracts between cohabitants are now often 
enforceable, Elizabeth Hodges, Comment, Will You “Contractually” Marry Me?, 
23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 385, 391–92 (2010), there are still some states 
that refuse to enforce them. See, e.g., Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1994); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979); Schwegmann 
v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 108. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995). 
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sacred bonds of marriage, is still a criminal act in twenty-one 
states (although rarely enforced),109 and still very much 
considered a sin by many. The criminalization of certain 
types of sexual activity within a marriage is a vestige of the 
historical view that adultery is not simply “a breach of the 
nuptial vow” but rather “a crime against society”: 
It is the destruction of all domestic confidence; the alienation of the 
affections of the wife from the husband; and the withdrawal of the 
protection and support of the father, from the child. It is the 
confusion of the issue, the corruption of the blood, casting upon a 
man the insufferable imposition of compelling him to maintain by 
his name, and with his property, as his own heir, the child of his 
worst enemy, which eminently distinguishes the crime of adultery 
from that of fornication. The true distinction between adultery and 
fornication, will be found to consist in this. That whenever the issue 
which may arise from the illicit intercourse, will be Legitimate, it is 
adultery: but on the contrary, if the issue will be a Bastard, it is 
fornication.110 
Courts frequently base their judgments on this moral 
denunciation. For example, in 1981, a state appellate court 
in Louisiana upheld a verdict that found a mother “morally 
unfit” to have custody of her young daughter because the 
mother, while married, engaged in a course of open and 
public adultery in disregard of generally accepted moral 
principles.111 Courts also consider adultery as marital fault 
weighing against the adulterer when determining equitable 
distribution. For example, in 2011, an appellate court in 
Mississippi upheld a trial court’s verdict that awarded the 
husband ninety percent of marital property after “weigh[ing] 
[the wife’s adultery] heavily against [her].”112 The use of 
 
 109. Deborah L. Rhode, Why is Adultery Still a Crime?, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 
2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rhode-
decriminalize-adultery-20160429-story.html. 
 110. State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380, 383 (1838). In 1840, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, prosecuted Hugh R. Hunter for violating an adultery statute, and 
stated that, “adultery is the sin of incontinence between persons, one or both of 
whom are married.” Hunter v. United States, Bur. 171 (Wis. 1840). 
 111. Bonner v. Bonner, 408 So. 2d 995, 998 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 112. Bond v. Bond, 2010-CA-00637-COA, 69 So. 3d 771, 772–73 (Miss. Ct. App. 
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adultery as marital fault extends to alimony as well. In 2014, 
an appellate court in South Carolina found that a trial court 
acted within its discretion when it denied alimony to a wife 
because her husband presented sufficient corroborating 
testimony to demonstrate that she had committed 
adultery.113 
Another way courts hand down moral judgment about 
non-marital relationships is through the preferential 
economic treatment of married couples referred to in Section 
I.A.1.a above.114 Most of the government-provided legal 
benefits offered to married couples have not been afforded to 
those in meretricious relationships. For example, after 
Michigan stopped recognizing any common-law marriage 
contracted after January 1, 1957, property rights afforded to 
a legally married couple have not been extended to those 
engaged in meretricious relationships.115 
Based on these historical and traditional views, the 
State’s ostensible justification for the criminalization of 
polygamy as necessary to uphold and protect the sacred 
institution of marriage is nearer the “idealized normative 
ideal” of theocracy, than to liberal democracy. For example, 
as early as 1890, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he state 
has a perfect right to prohibit polygamy, and all other open 
offenses against the enlightened sentiment of mankind, 
notwithstanding the pretence of religious conviction by 
which they may be advocated and practiced.”116 Later, in 
Reynolds, the Court justified its holding criminalizing 
polygamy by noting that marriage by its nature is “a sacred 
obligation,”117 and that polygamy has always been “an 
 
2011). 
 113. Mick-Skaggs v. Skaggs, 766 S.E.2d 870, 874 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014). 
 114. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 115. Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
 116. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 50 (1890). 
 117. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878). The Reynolds Court 
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offence against society.”118 Here, the offense against society 
is still functionally a supposed offense against “the sacred” 
with no identifiable harm—the paradigmatic theocratic 
reasoning: 
Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits 
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which 
government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as 
monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the 
principles on which the government of the people, to a greater or 
less extent, rests.119 
The Maynard Court similarly used language relating to 
the sanctity of marriage to justify its decision to criminalize 
polygamy. The Court noted: 
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having 
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any 
other institution, has always been subject to the control of the 
legislature. . . . It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in 
its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither 
civilization nor progress.120 
Fallacy results when monogamy in its modern form is 
compared to polygamy’s dominant historical form. 
Historically, polygamous relationships have been 
characterized by exploitation and oppression of women. The 
practice of polygamy often coincides with crimes targeting 
 
noted: 
From that day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been 
a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence 
against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more 
or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe 
that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to 
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social 
life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is 
nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually 
regulated by law. 
Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). 
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women and children, such as incest, sexual assault, statutory 
rape, and failure to pay child support.121 Evidence from 
Africa and the Middle East indicates higher rates of domestic 
violence in polygamous marriages, including sexual abuse.122 
Likely as a result, women in polygynous unions are at risk of 
increased mental health problems, and children in 
polygynous unions fare worse than their counterparts in 
monogamous marriages in a variety of ways, including 
higher death rates.123 Polygamy in the United States also has 
a long history of misogyny and extremely oppressive 
patriarchy, as well as a history of statutory rape.124 
But the reality is that both monogamy and polygamy 
were historically designed to serve the needs of men and as 
a tool used to enslave women. Both forms of family formation 
have oppressed millions of women around the world, creating 
psychologically and physically damaging relationships. The 
pervasive problem of oppression of women in both types of 
family formations indicates that the cause is not limited to 
just one of the forms of family. A new, modern contract model 
is warranted and overdue. 
2. Current Trends 
a. Marriage 
Today, many of the historical problems with the 
institution of marriage remain, although in modified form. 
Marriage still disadvantages women in many ways, 
including by the continued prevalence of domestic violence. 
 
 121. See generally Vazquez, supra note 25, at 239–45. 
 122. See generally Rose McDermott, Expert REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, VANCOUVER REGISTRY NO. S-097767, 5, https:// 
stoppolygamyincanada.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/mcdermott-report.pdf. 
 123. See generally id. 
 124. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 137 P.3d 726, 752 (Utah 2006) 
(upholding the conviction of a man on charges of bigamy and sexual contact with 
a minor when he married a 16-year-old girl in a religious ceremony). 
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Women continue to do worse in the employment market,125 
which increases their dependence on their spouse, which in 
turn weakens their autonomy and perpetuates the 
subordination of women in a marriage. It is widely thought 
that marriage continues to be “a central instrument in the 
denial of women’s status as full citizens.”126 
Despite great advances in the legal treatment of 
domestic violence,127 statistics show that domestic violence 
against the woman remains widespread in our society,128 and 
“[c]ommunity-based research indicates that almost one out 
of every four married women will be struck by their 
husbands at some time during their marriage.”129 The 
American criminal justice system still tends to be reluctant 
to interfere in private family life,130 based on the historical 
view that “the preservation of marital privacy and domestic 
harmony require[s] that the law stay out of the relationship 
 
 125. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-18-1240, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—JULY 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. 
 126. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 619–20 n.210 
(2013) (internal citation omitted). 
 127. In the mid-1970s, state legislatures and courts finally began to realize 
that there was no place for marital rape exemptions in “modern American law 
and society.” Klarfeld, supra note 52, at 1819 (quoting People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 
702, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). During this period, marital rape exemption laws 
began to dissolve. Id. at 1826; Sack, supra note 57, at 35. In fact by 1993, all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia recognized marital rape as a crime. Klarfeld, 
supra note 52, at 1819. This “profound shift in domestic violence policy” led 
Congress to pass the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. § 13701 
(2012)), which was “the first comprehensive federal response to the problem of 
domestic violence.” Kinports, supra note 58, at 156 (footnote omitted); Sack, 
supra note 57, at 36 (footnote omitted). 
 128. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the 
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991); see also I Married a Monster: 
The Horrors of Domestic Violence, 51 R.I.B.J. 29, 30 (2003) (noting that “[v]iolence 
is a common occurrence in ten (10%) to twenty-five (25%) per cent of all marriages 
in the United States and cuts across all racial, age and economic lines” (citing 
TAMARA L. ROLEFF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 16–17 (2000))). 
 129. Sana Loue, Intimate Partner Violence Bridging the Gap Between Law and 
Science, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 1 (2000). 
 130. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and 
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1192 (2007). 
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between husband and wife.”131 The way the criminal justice 
system treats sex offenses committed within marriages is 
one example of the “long-lasting” marks the historical nature 
of marriage has left.132 
Another residual effect of coverture prevailing today is 
the presumption that a married couple’s division of labor 
should be gendered pursuant to each spouse’s “natural role.” 
Women still “fare more poorly in the employment market and 
thus are more dependent on their spouses,”133 and women 
are particularly burdened at home due to the division of 
labor. According to De Beauvoir, a woman’s work within the 
home does not provide her with any autonomy. She is not 
useful to the wider society; her work is seen as being mere 
maintenance. A woman’s work is only given meaning 
through her husband and children—”she is justified through 
them; but in their lives she is only an inessential 
intermediary.”134 Despite the fact that her obedience is no 
longer a legal obligation, this does not change the way that 
she is perceived in society. It is very difficult for a woman 
(wife) to gain recognition for her work, to be “respected as a 
complete person.” However respected a woman is, she is still 
regarded as “subordinate, secondary, parasitic.”135 
While women’s expected labor within the marital 
relation is left wanting for excitement, so is the romance. In 
Western countries, almost all of which have forbidden 
polygamy, adultery is rampant. Indeed, according to the 
General Social Survey, the rate of infidelity has been pretty 
constant at around twenty-one percent for married men, and 
 
 131. See Klarfeld, supra note 52, at 1826; Sack, supra note 57, at 33–34. 
 132. See Candice A. Garcia-Rodrigo, An Analysis of and Alternative to the 
Radical Feminist Position on the Institution of Marriage, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
113, 117 (2008). 
 133. Aloni, supra note 126, at 620. 
 134. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 510 (H. M. Parshley ed. & 
trans., First Vintage Books 1974) (1949). 
 135. See id. at 501. 
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between ten to fifteen percent for married women.136 Overall, 
fewer and fewer individuals and couples are choosing to 
marry,137 and those who do are divorcing at alarming 
rates.138 The monogamous, state-sponsored marriage policy 
is unsuccessful according to its own terms. 
Despite the shocking historical practice of marriage and 
the continued suppression of women in the lingering shadow 
of coverture, the State still promotes marriage as the 
idealized form of personal relationship. The State’s interest 
in marriage is apparent from the benefits granted to married 
people. There are approximately 1,049 federal laws in the 
United States Code that consider marital status as a factor139 
and the vast majority of those laws provide economic benefits 
for the married couple. For example, the tax code provides 
tax breaks to married couples,140 the bankruptcy code allows 
for a favorable choice of different filing options for married 
couples,141 and surviving spouses of a marriage receive a 
 
 136. Richard A. Friedman, Infidelity Lurks in Your Genes, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/infidelity-lurks-in-
your-genes.html. 
 137. See Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in 
Shaping Family Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1034, 1038 
(2015). 
 138. The conventional wisdom is that half of all marriages end in divorce. See 
William J. Doherty & Leah Ward Sears, Delaying Divorce to Save Marriages, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/delaying-
divorce-to-save-marriages/2011/10/19/gIQAKh0f1L_story.html?utm_term=.76c5 
66eff427. 
 139. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE 
ACT, 4 (1997). 
 140. There are fifty-nine provisions in the Federal Income Tax Code under 
which tax liability depends on marital status. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., 
GAO/GGD-96-175, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED 
AND SINGLE INDIVIDUALS, 3 (1996). When a married couple’s incomes have large 
disparities, they often receive a tax bonus because the spouse with the higher 
income will pay less in taxes by filing jointly then he or she would have filing as 
a single person. Id. The tax treatment appears to preference traditional notions 
of marriage where a partnership is formed between a wage earner and a 
homemaker. 
 141. Under the bankruptcy code, a husband and wife can opt to file for 
944 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
number of “death benefits,” such as social security.142 Indeed, 
“the entire federal tax scheme fosters and subsidizes the 
economics of marriage.”143 As a result, “those who do not 
participate in the ‘economic partnership’ of matrimony may 
suffer financially.”144 For instance, one of the authors would 
save thousands of dollars a year on health insurance costs 
but-for being a co-habitant rather than a legal spouse. 
For the most part, the historical and current emphasis 
on marriage has trumped or limited private decision-making 
in these areas because the state treats the marital unit as a 
fundamental part of policy-making in a way that excludes 
other increasingly common family forms. Indeed, 
historically, the law has treated non-married partners as 
strangers or third parties.145 Setting economic benefits 
within the construct of marriage elevates the status of 
marriage and herds couples into a state-designed and 
 
bankruptcy jointly. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). Since couples are often jointly liable 
for debts and own property jointly, the statute facilitates the consolidation of the 
estates, which reduces administration costs and only requires one filing fee. Even 
though they are filing jointly, the statute allows each party to claim federal 
exemptions as if they were filing separately, although some states have opted out 
of this. Id. § 522(m). 
 142. Once a couple meets the marriage requirements, a surviving spouse has 
access to survivors’ insurance benefits and have more options in how they receive 
retirement benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (2012). Spouses can elect to take [their] 
own benefits, or instead take 50% of a spouse’s benefit. As in tax treatment, this 
would not benefit equal wage earners but in beneficial for marital couples with 
disparate wages. 
 143. Robson, supra note 17, at 786. However, tax policy benefits married 
couples with disparate incomes and “penalizes” married couples with similar 
incomes, functioning as state perpetuation of the historical trend in the West of 
the husband in the “public sphere” and the wife in the “private.” Taxes: Who Gets 
a Marriage Bonus and Who a Penalty, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2014, 10:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/video/taxes-who-gets-a-marriage-bonus-and-who-a-
penalty/13172E38-C73B-49F4-9EF8-9357FC6CB6F1.html. 
 144. Robson, supra note 17, at 783. 
 145. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 
341, 349 (2002) (explaining that “[l]ike other third parties, when a lesbian 
coparent seeks ongoing custody and visitation with the biological child of her 
same-sex partner, she is often unsuccessful in overcoming the constitutional 
principles of parental autonomy and privacy”). 
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regulated institution.146 
Presumably the State’s primary interest in marriage is 
to promote the integrity of the family and create optimal 
child rearing conditions. Marriage is assumed by 
policymakers to be the best environment for raising healthy 
and successful children, without demonstrable evidence. 
Instead, parochial ideology plays the justifying role. For 
example, the United States Congress considers marriage an 
“essential institution of a successful society” and the optimal 
environment for successful child rearing.147 The current 
rationale, at least in part, is based on findings from “welfare 
reform” legislation, known as the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996.148 Among other things, Congress found that children 
born out of wedlock, specifically to unwed mothers age 
seventeen and under, are more likely to experience abuse 
and neglect, have lower cognitive scores and educational 
aspirations, become teenage parents themselves, and be on 
welfare when they grow up.149 
The State’s concerns with family values dovetails 
seamlessly with the economic interest in preventing unwed 
motherhood. Congress found that young, unwed mothers are 
not only more likely to go on public assistance, but also more 
likely to remain on public assistance for longer periods. 
“These combined effects of ‘younger and longer’ increase total 
AFDC [(aid to families with dependent children)] costs per 
household by 25 percent to 30 percent for 17-year-olds.”150 
Notably, Congress also found that an “increase in the 
 
 146. See generally Robson, supra note 17, at 795 (discussing the primacy of 
marriage and the “zeal of elected federal officials to exalt marriage”); Zalesne, 
supra note 137, at 1066–68. 
 147. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101(2)–(3), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 
note (2012) (Congressional Findings)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 101(8)(B)–(F), 110 Stat. at 2111. 
 150. Id. § 101(8)(A), 110 Stat. at 2111. 
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number of children receiving public assistance is closely 
related to the increase in births to unmarried women,” 
framed as a “problem” to be solved.151 
Laws providing benefits to married people also attempt 
to promote sexual behavioral norms. Marriage can be seen as 
promoting abstinence from sex outside marriage, and in 
particular, abstinence from premarital sex by teenagers and 
young adults. Marriage also promotes monogamy and 
opposite-sex relationships, and is often regarded as “the 
expected standard of human sexual activity.”152 The 
government message fostered by sex education is that 
marriage is the “only acceptable condition for sexual 
expression.”153 
The State’s promotion of traditional marriage as a means 
of achieving conformity with normative sexual behavior, 
family stability, and economic security is problematic for two 
main reasons. First, the means-ends relationship is tenuous 
and often reversed, propelling the myth that marriage 
actually helps to achieve any of these goals, when the 
government often uses these values to promote the 
institution of marriage itself. Second, the means-ends 
justification assumes that the government’s goals are in fact 
legitimate. 
Promoting traditional marriage is only tangentially 
related to the goals of building stronger family units or 
enhancing economic security. Interestingly, a 1990 United 
States Department of Health and Human Services report 
identifying characteristics of strong families references six 
studies and forty-nine characteristics before the mention of 
“marriage.”154 While “economic security” can play a role in 
 
 151. Id. § 101(5)(C), 110 Stat. at 2110. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(D) (2012). 
 153. Robson, supra note 17, at 798. 
 154. MARIA KRYSAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL FAMILIES: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTRUCTS AND SELECTED 
MEASURES 20–22 (1990), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/idsucfam.pdf. 
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promoting a stronger family unit, it is not dispositive. 
Economic security is more closely related with class and 
socio-economic factors than with marriage. Congress fails to 
consider how socio-economic conditions and government 
(non)spending at the federal, state and local level, with 
grossly inadequate services devoted to basic human need, 
functions to leave the non-married vulnerable. By promoting 
marriage through economic benefits, the State contributes to 
economic stability and social acceptance, which may lead to 
an easier lifestyle for married couples. Tax cuts for capital 
investments also lead to an easier life for the investor. No 
one would argue that because the beneficiaries of capital 
gains tax-cuts are wealthy, the capital gains tax reduction is 
what made them so—that is, unless one’s ideological lenses 
require a government for the already privileged rather than 
for the vulnerable, the function of the prevailing law around 
marriage. In its promotion of marriage to achieve the goals 
of “stability” and “happiness,” the government perpetuates 
the monogamous marital paradigm and fails to consider the 
larger socio-economic and class factors that play a much 
more important role in determining outcomes. 
Further, to the extent that monogamy has been justified 
by arguments that people are happiest in monogamous 
marriages, empirical evidence can be adduced that financial 
stability is the cause of both the marriage and the happiness, 
rather than monogamy being the cause of happiness. It is 
arbitrary to say people will be happier in monogamous 
relationships than in polygamous ones. The intimate 
arrangements making Peter happy or Paul happy are, like 
religious practice, up to them.155 
Although the State exalts the virtues of abstinence 
 
 155. Sincere religious converts demonstrate that happiness is a function of the 
relationship between the individual will and the manifestation of a particular 
form of life. On the other hand, what has historically been called “piety” or 
“piousness” is a function of the relationship between the manifestation of a 
particular form of life and social approval. We are political liberals, interested in 
citizens’ happiness, not their so-called piety. 
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before marriage, monogamy, and other sexual behavioral 
norms, promoting traditional marriage has little, if any, 
effect on achieving these government ends. While the 
government, in the past, has put significant resources 
toward promoting abstinence before marriage,156 it is unclear 
whether such promotion of “normative” behavior as a public 
health goal is even realistic.157 Indeed, despite state efforts 
to promote abstinence until marriage, “[a]lmost all 
Americans have sex before marrying.”158 
By subsidizing marriage through the enticement of a 
bundle of economic benefits, the State lures couples into 
marriage, using the ends—economic stability—to justify and 
promote the means—marriage. This tautological 
justification boils down to the State lauding marriage as a 
means to achieving greater economic security, while at the 
same time exclusively subsidizing married couples with 
disparate incomes. 
These State objectives are not necessarily legitimate. 
The framing of marriage as a space for permissible sexual 
expression implicates a free-speech-like analysis that sees 
the State as arguably suppressing extra-marital sexual 
expression. In the most recent major Supreme Court 
articulation of the role of marriage in society, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, granting the right to same-sex marriage, Justice 
Kennedy ambiguously but conspicuously wrote that 
marriage provides “other freedoms, such as expression.”159 
So long as there remains only one form of marriage, the 
content of the “expression” is largely meaningless. More 
significant are the fact of marriage and the identity of the 
 
 156. Robson, supra note 17, at 797 As an example, from 1995 to 2000, Congress 
increased federal funding for abstinence only sex-education by three thousand 
percent. Elizabeth Arndorfer, Absent Abstinence Accountability, 27 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 585, 585–86 (2000). 
 157. Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954–
2003, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 73, 73 (2007). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
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participants. Thus if Steve, Ted, and Bob’s tantric trio is 
denied a formally recognized marriage, their individual 
expression as equal partners in a tantric trio is 
suppressed.160 
b. Beyond Marriage 
Whatever the range of actual practices, the normatively 
idealized form of life we call monogamy, in the abstract, 
consists of the romantic ideal, the coming together of two 
loving persons, ultimate mutual commitment, mutual 
growth, lasting love, and meaningful mutual concern for one 
another undisturbed by distracting passions. Similarly, 
whatever the actual practices, in the abstract, the 
normatively idealized form of life we may call multiple 
marriage consists of a man with multiple wives or women 
with multiple husbands with the same normative features as 
monogamy, with “mutual” replaced by “cooperative.” Finally, 
whatever the actual practices, the normatively idealized 
form of life we call polyamory, in the abstract, consists of 
multiple ongoing relationships either intermingled or 
independent of each other in terms of substance but 
dependent on consent to non-monogamy in each case, honest 
and open communication, and trust among all partners. As 
with the various religious normatively idealized forms of life, 
the state justifiably privileges none of the above. 
Most feminists and others rightly worry about the 
exploitation of women who “choose” polygamy. It is thought 
that the consent is not truly voluntary, or is weakened by the 
need for financial security, power disparities, or religious 
acceptance.161 Perhaps polygamy carries too much historical 
baggage to ever be rectified in modern times. Critics of 
polygamy are correct to say that in those particular cases 
exploitation obtains. However, exploitation in those cases 
derives from the involuntariness, the need for financial 
 
 160. See id.; supra introductory vignette. 
 161. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
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security, the power disparity, or the religious ideology, not 
polygamy as such.162 
While patriarchy and religious fanaticism are the roots 
of exploitation and abuse in polygamous marriage, the same 
could be said about exploitation and abuse in monogamous 
marriage with no less force. Given the extensive feminist 
critiques of monogamous marriage and coverture, and the 
many ways that monogamous marriage has simply been a 
tool of male power and inheritance, we can see that 
oppression of women occurs in both monogamous and 
polygamous marriage. 
We retain the burden to confront the argument that 
ostensible choice masks exploitation. First, exploitation can 
be divided into structural exploitation and transactional 
exploitation. Marxist political theorists tend to believe that 
society’s economic institutions are arranged such that 
workers are structurally exploited. Marxist feminists tend to 
believe that marriage in all of its forms, whether 
monogamous or polygamous, is structurally exploitative of 
women in that women’s vulnerability is both the cause and 
effect of the prevailing marital structure. Transactional 
exploitation, however, is exploitation in a single transaction, 
as when an artist selling a painting at an auction gets $100 
as the highest bid when the $100 dollar bidder mendaciously 
told all potentially higher bidders that the auction was 
cancelled.163 
 
 162. Subordination of women in our society stems from and rests on deeply 
ingrained social norms and economic structures. “It is generally assumed that 
women in America are better off than women in other countries.” Ray Jablonksi, 
Five Reasons Why Gender Inequality is Worse in U.S. Than Elsewhere in the 
World, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/nation/ 
index.ssf/2015/12/five_reasons_why_gender_inequa.html. However, the United 
States is far behind international standards in gender pay inequality, maternity 
leave, affordable childcare, women’s reproductive rights, and violence against 
women. Id. 
 163. Alan Wertheimer & Matt Zwolinski, Exploitation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL. (Dec. 20, 2001), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/ (last 
updated Aug. 16, 2016). 
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Structural exploitation occurs when the ‘rules of the 
game’ favor some people against others, as when monopolies 
obstruct a free market or a manufacturer benefits from 
tariffs on foreign goods.164 Similarly, transactional 
exploitation occurs “when A gains more from an interaction, 
and B gains less, than they would have were it not for the 
existence of a prior injustice”165 or “background injustice.”166 
In other words, exploitation consists of a voluntary action, 
the benefits of which are less than they would have been if 
the procedure or background institutions were fair. 
Oppression of women in polygamous relationships 
historically results from background conditions more than 
from mere participation in polygamy because the conditions 
out of which a woman chooses to enter a polygamous 
relationship (e.g., economic vulnerability, religious ideology) 
or the actual background conditions in society (e.g., 
patriarchy or repressive theocracy) corrupt the procedure 
ushering the ostensibly free choice. In the United States, 
there are believed to be between 50,000 and 100,000 
practicing polygamists, most of whom are Muslim and 
Mormon families.167 These families often practice polygamy 
based upon a fundamentalist interpretation of early Mormon 
and Islam teachings, giving rise to conditions ripe for 
oppression of women participants. Polygamy is for the most 
part nonexistent outside the practices of these two 
 
 164. See generally Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS 
225 (1984). 
 165. Wertheimer & Zwolinski, supra note 163. 




 167. Samantha Allen, Polygamy is More Popular Than Ever, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Jun. 2, 2015, 5:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/02/ 
polygamy-is-more-popular-than-ever.html (noting that “[r]ough estimates place 
the polygamous population in the U.S. somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 
people, chiefly in Muslim and fundamentalist Mormon families”). 
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religions,168 and there is little to no evidence surrounding 
polygamy divorced from religious practices. Thus, while 
polygamy is most often associated with the religious 
patriarchal teachings surrounding the practice, oppression of 
women is not necessarily inherent in the practice of 
polygamy as a stand-alone “normatively idealized form of 
life,” and cannot logically be considered the result of the 
practice of three- or four-person marital relations. 
While historically there is great evidence of oppression 
in polygamous relationships, contract law and criminal law 
already contain protections against exploitation and abuse. 
In terms of the initial decision to enter a polygamous 
relationship, the contract defenses of duress, undue 
influence, and unconscionability ask the factual question of 
whether the weaker party effectively had alternative courses 
of action available and whether she entered into the contract 
voluntarily with full knowledge.169 The contract defense of 
capacity mandates that a contract entered with a minor is 
voidable at the option of the minor.170 In terms of abuse 
during the marriage, state assault and battery laws aim to 
prevent a man from physically abusing his wife. Federal laws 
like the Violence Against Women Act of 1994171 provide 
additional layers of protection for women suffering from 
domestic violence, sexual assault and other types of violence 
against women.172 Since contract and criminal law already 
 
 168. It is difficult to pin point exactly who practices polygamy given that it is 
outlawed in many parts of the world, but it is generally believed that polygamy 
in the US “flourishes in self-segregated communities, Mormon-fundamentalist 
and Muslim-immigrant, rather than being widely distributed across society.” 
Ross Douthat, The Prospects For Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-the-prospects 
-for-polygamy.html?_r=1. 
 169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175, 177, 208 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
 170. See id. §§ 12, 14. 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012). 
 172. OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., LAWS 
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, https://www.womenshealth.gov/violence-against-
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maintain the tools to conduct these types of analyses, 
oppression in polygamous relationships, in theory, can be 
controlled. 
The potential for polyamorous plural marriage presents 
another opportunity to locate alleged intrinsic harms on 
contingent background factors. Polyamory is simply the 
practice of having ongoing intimate and/or romantic 
relationships with more than one person, whether 
independent relationships or unions of three or more 
people.173 The alleged harms derive from the ideological 
presumption that monogamy is to be understood as moral 
and proper, universally and for its own sake, natural rather 
than a political institution. With greater numbers of people 
involved in the romantic lives of participants, it is natural 
that there will be increased complexity and increased 
partner turnover. The emotional complexity of interacting 
intimately with more people appears to be inherent to this 
love style. If emotional upheaval—including jealousy or fear 
of abandonment—goes with the territory of intimate 
relating, the chances of emotional upheaval increase 
exponentially when multiple partners are involved.174 
However, jealous lovers may be more inclined toward 
monogamy while people less likely by constitution to be 
jealous may be more open to polyamory. Either way, respect 
for autonomy is the just policy. 
In addition, the framing of polyamorous practices as 
cheating-lite or as an attempt to mitigate the despair of 
monogamy pathologizes polyamory by characterizing it as a 
defensive mechanism or an escape. Many couples, however, 
consider it a thrill or simply a realistic approach to complex, 
human sexuality. 
 
women/laws-on-violence-against-women/ (last updated Mar. 2, 2018). 
 173. Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1461, 1479 (2011). 
 174. See generally Deborah Anapol, The Downside of Polyamory, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY (Nov. 27, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/love-without-
limits/201011/the-downside-polyamory. 
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Increased partner turnover can also have negative 
effects on the children involved. Children report 
experiencing some pain at losing the friendship of adults no 
longer involved in their lives.175 This loss, as differentiated 
from loss of a parent from divorce, may be worse because in 
many cases of divorce there is visitation and continued 
parental involvement of both parents.176 Finally, there is 
currently reported bias against polyamorous parents in the 
legal system, social disapproval (specifically the risk of 
rejection by family, friends and coworkers), and 
discrimination. 
However, there are benefits associated with polyamory, 
including accelerated personal growth. With polyamory, it is 
possible to get the benefit of several lifetimes worth of 
mistakes in a short time because multiple ongoing intimate 
relationships present complex dilemmas and opportunities 
to act with integrity. Because multiple-partner relationships 
are inherently more complex and demanding than 
monogamous ones and because they challenge the norms of 
our culture, they offer unique valuable learning 
opportunities.177 Children raised in polyamorous households 
may benefit alongside their parents. “These children are 
more insightful and wise, and open to understanding 
diversity and many forms of religion and culture.”178 
“Polyamory can help men and women break out of 
dysfunctional sex roles and achieve more equal, sexually 
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LIVING SINGLE (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/living-
single/201301/is-polyamory-bad-the-children. 
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gratifying, and respectful relationships simply because of its 
novelty.”179 
Polyamory’s benefits can extend to the duties of everyday 
life. 
More adults sharing parenting can mean less stress and less 
burnout without losing any of the rewards. In a larger group of men 
and women, it’s more likely that one or two adults will be willing 
and able to stay home and care for the family or that each could be 
available one or two days a week. If one parent dies or becomes 
disabled, other family members can fill the gap. It’s possible for 
children to have more role models, more playmates, and more love 
in a group environment.180 
Polyamory might also have financial benefits. 
“Polyamory can mean a higher standard of living while 
consuming fewer resources. Sexualoving partners are more 
likely than friends or neighbors to feel comfortable sharing 
housing, transportation, appliances, and other resources.”181 
Polyamory may be good for the social life as well. 
“[P]olyamorous people tend to maintain more friendships as 
they keep a wider social network. They are also less likely to 
cut off contact after a break-up. Monogamous couples on the 
other hand, often withdraw from their friends in the first, 
loved-up stages of their relationship.”182 Lastly, polyamory 
could benefit everyone in existing relationships by adding 
spark and fulfillment to a healthy relationship and removing 
“the fear inherent in some monogamous relationships related 
to the potential for abandonment.”183 
Nonetheless, the relevant factor in evaluating the justice 
as fairness of State policy is not whether polyamorous 
practices are beneficial, but whether they are, more or less 
sufficiently and inherently harmful to warrant unequal 
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treatment or even criminalization. Since the alleged harms 
associated with polyamory are located on contingent 
background factors, the evidence suggests otherwise. The 
aim here is to formalize already existing practices so as to 
facilitate, not determine, private activity based on private 
choices. 
3. The Importance of State Neutrality: The Analogy 
Between Marriage & Religion 
Insofar as the justification for State-sanctioned 
monogamy is that people will be “happier” in one way or 
another, the State is violating the principle of liberalism that 
the State should not promote one conception of the good life 
over another, especially in a pluralistic society. 
Establishment Clause184 jurisprudence provides useful 
analytical tools and precedent—the State similarly takes no 
position on which of the many religions will lead to 
happiness, spiritual fulfillment or eternal paradise. Both 
marriage and religion are normatively idealized forms of life, 
inherently contested and existing in various forms. For both, 
as far as the state is concerned, neutrality is the just 
governing principle. The Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment is concerned more than anywhere else in United 
States law with rigorous adherence to the principle of state 
neutrality. 
Our government treats religion with neutrality because 
religion is considered profoundly personal, a matter of 
conscience, and an intimate relation with the divine—either 
through scripture, mystical experience, ritual practices or 
tradition. The State, consistent with the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause, may never privilege, endorse, involve 
itself with, nor act with animus toward any religion. The 
founding generation, enlightened by the period following the 
religious wars in Europe, knew the dangers of a State-
established church and appreciated the rights of religious 
 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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minorities—arguably, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison 
each did not believe in the Christian god. 
The comparably deeply personal nature of marriage, 
household constitution, and family formation also trigger the 
value of State neutrality in this area of the law. In the words 
of Justice Black, the Establishment Clause “stands as an 
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our 
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy 
to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil 
magistrate.”185 “Religion” can easily be replaced with 
“household constitution” or “family formation.” The “civil 
magistrate” has no more business interfering in marital 
relationships than in congregational ones. 
The Court fails to treat marriage like religion, as a 
normatively idealized form of life manifesting in various 
forms. In the nineteenth century, the Reynolds Court stated, 
“it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil 
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy 
shall be the law of social life under its dominion.”186 The 
current government policy privileges monogamy over 
polygamy now no less than as articulated then. The modern 
reaction to this line tests our commitment to the principles 
underlying the liberal state and poses the question: should 
the state “determine . . . the law of social life”187 in the 
private space where ”freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, 
and spirituality”188 are pursued in private life? 
Under the Establishment Clause, the government policy 
must have a secular purpose and not simply a “sham secular 
 
 185. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (holding that a New York State 
program offering nondenominational, optional prayer time in public schools 
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purpose” masking a religiously motivated policy.189 If so, as 
long as there are neither excessive entanglements between 
the government and religion nor the privileging or burdening 
thereof, then the government policy will be upheld.190 The 
Supreme Court has explained: 
When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an 
arguably religious policy, the government’s characterization is, of 
course, entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of 
the courts to distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere 
one.191 
The judicial duty articulated is especially important 
considering what is at stake. Justice Stevens explained that 
the Establishment Clause is intended not only to protect us 
from explicit state coercion of citizens in favor of religion, but 
also from more imperceptible harms that both grow and hide 
with time: 
[T]he Constitution also requires that we keep in mind the myriad 
and subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be 
eroded . . . and that we guard against other different, yet equally 
important, constitutional injuries. One is the mere passage by the 
District of a policy that has the purpose and perception of 
government establishment of religion.192 
Here, the Court is concerned with Establishment Clause 
“values,” not rules or elements. The injury, more abstract in 
nature, is a government policy that confuses the parochial for 
the universal and private interest for public interest. Our 
prevailing government policy toward marriage confuses the 
parochial for the universal in that monogamy is considered 
both universally desired for all individuals as well as fitting 
and proper for each and every community in multi-cultural 
 
 189. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (holding that a 
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America. In addition, our prevailing government policy 
toward marriage confuses public interest for private interest. 
The private interest is the perpetuation of Victorian sexual 
norms. The public interest, however, is State neutrality. 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence also illustrates the 
way ideology and judicial overemphasis on “history and 
traditions” corrupts justice as fairness. For instance, in an 
opinion upholding the constitutionality of a memorial of the 
Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capitol, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist posited that, “[o]ur institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being.”193 Actually, Thomas Paine 
was a flaming atheist, George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson were demonstrably skeptical of the interventionist 
notion of God, and the role of the secular legal profession and 
argumentation in the Federalist Papers and elsewhere 
undergirded our constitution-making process. Despite our 
country’s current religious culture, statistics regarding the 
rising number of atheists today also belie that fact.194 
Elsewhere, in a case upholding the constitutionality 
under the Establishment Clause of an official, tax-funded 
chaplain formally leading prayer before the Nebraska State 
Legislature, the Court engaged in a form of constitutional 
interpretation that, if applied in other contexts, would reduce 
our judicial institutions to a power serving formalism and 
our society to zombie-like eternal recurrence: 
Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses 
did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a 
violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions 
with prayer has continued without interruption ever since that 
early session of Congress . . . [and] legislative and other deliberative 
public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and 
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tradition of this country.195 
In these cases, the Court disproportionately weighed as 
a factor the contingencies of social habit and practices both 
in the background, and in the actual legal analysis, contrary 
to the underlying purposes of the Establishment Clause. 
This emphasis sets the frame for a prejudicial legal analysis. 
In a different constitutional context, the Due Process 
Clause, fewer unjust policies are now saved by their 
histories. Justice Kennedy writes of “substantive” 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause jurisprudence 
in the Obergefell majority decision: 
If [fundamental] rights were defined by who exercised them in the 
past, then received practices could serve as their own continued 
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once 
denied . . . . History and tradition guide and discipline [courts 
when] . . . identifying interests of the person so fundamental that 
the State must accord them its respect[,] but do not set its outer 
boundaries[; t]hat method respects our history and learns from it 
without allowing the past alone to rule the present.196 
The trend toward de-emphasis of “history and tradition” 
in Due Process Clause analysis is a good sign for progressive-
thinking people, and polygamy has been explicitly addressed 
in that context. With respect to polygamous marriage, for 
example, Chief Justice Roberts responded to Justice 
Kennedy’s assertion that, under a Due Process Clause 
analysis, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is 
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”197 with a 
passage that is worth quoting in full: 
It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply 
with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural 
marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two 
women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such 
profound choices,” why would there be any less dignity in the bond 
between three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to 
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make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the 
constitutional right to marry because their children would 
otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser,” why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three 
or more persons raising children? If not having the opportunity to 
marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian 
couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” serve 
to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in 
polyamorous relationships?198 
The legal principles articulated above, although 
pursuant to the First Amendment and Due Process Clauses, 
are transferable to our understanding of marriage as a 
contract. The religious, ideological, ethical, or moral views of 
eighteenth century slaveholding men are not relevant factors 
in constitutional interpretation in the liberal paradigm or 
any other concerned with justice and fairness in a large, 
twenty-first century multicultural democracy. 
B. Marriage as Private Contract 
Family now, more than any time in human history, is 
voluntary and private by virtue of consent and the range of 
possible household structures.199 Because the family can be 
considered a private institution consisting of voluntary 
members, the State has no authority or interest in 
intervening absent serious identifiable harms to identifiable 
persons.200 As private arrangements, intimate relations 
should be governed instead by principles of privacy and 
autonomy. 
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1. Marriage as a Private Institution 
Intimate relations are not social enterprises, but rather 
private arrangements, and should therefore be governed by 
principles of privacy and autonomy. Insofar as marriage is 
treated as a public arrangement, private life becomes an arm 
of the state; but a just state is the arm of a free people. 
In a private institution, the participants are the 
stakeholders. With the exception of minors, participants are 
members voluntarily. In a public institution, on the other 
hand, the participants are not the only stakeholders. 
Instead, general members of the public that are ultimately 
influenced or affected by the institution involuntarily are 
stakeholders. In this Section, we make the argument that, 
since family is private, the State should involve itself no 
further in family formation than to enforce private 
contractual arrangements made on the basis of meaningful 
choice and consent. 
Consent, market forces, and contract law, based on 
individual needs, individual desires, and societal demand, 
are best for dealing with people’s varied private interests.201 
People have a fundamental right, both morally and legally, 
to privacy and freedom when it comes to personal 
relationships, so intervention where there are private 
agreements is not usually justified unless there is 
identifiable harm to identifiable individuals.202 However, 
when parties attempt to define the contours of their families 
and secure rights through contract, they are often met with 
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legal hostility.203 Despite the fact that their contracts are 
between private parties, and even when those parties have 
given full consent, such contracts continue to be either 
unevenly enforced or unenforceable altogether.204 Courts do 
not enforce family contracts in the same ways they enforce 
contracts outside the family context, as principles of freedom 
of contract are not applied in the same ways and to the same 
degree in the family context.205 
For those who believe that the law already treats 
marriage as a contract, consider the words of Canadian 
Political Philosopher Will Kymlicka. When it comes to 
marriage: 
there is no written document, each party gives up its right to self-
protection, the terms of the contract cannot be renegotiated, neither 
party need understand its terms, it must be between two and only 
two people, and [until 2013] these two people must be one man and 
one woman.206 
Such non-waivable provisions belie the notion that the 
contractual arrangement is the outcome of meaningful 
choices and prudent planning on behalf of the participants. 
Despite the fact that marriage is one the most important 
relations in most people’s lives, the participants have as little 
say in the terms and conditions as they do over the terms and 
conditions of clickwrap agreements.207 
 
2. Autonomy, Assent, and Meaningful Choice 
As long as the natural restrictive parameters of informed 
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 207. Clickwrap agreements are agreements entered over the Internet under 
which users must agree to terms and conditions before using a company’s services 
or products. Typically, a user has no ability to negotiate the terms before 
agreeing. See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP AGREEMENTS (2013). 
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consent in contract law are policed, private agreements 
concerning any variety of intimate relationships, including 
polyamory or even polygamy, should be enforced within just 
communitarian parameters (likely varying among 
jurisdictions), so as to give credibility to the two-person 
marriage option as a meaningful choice among alternatives, 
so as to recognize the wide array of possible conceptions of 
the good life, and so as to respect the autonomy of individual 
participants. 
Meaningful choice requires more than one reasonable 
option and an absence of coercion. In order for choice 
surrounding marriage to be meaningful, women and men 
must have the option of exercising choice with respect to 
whether and whom to marry. Thus, arrangements other than 
two-person marriage, such as being unmarried, polygamous, 
or polyamorous, which are not inherently harmful, should be 
available and recognized by the State, with the participants 
determined by the parties to the union themselves. Available 
options might include intimate non-sexual partnerships with 
or without cohabitation and with or without formal 
recognition, intimate sexual partnerships with or without 
cohabitation and with or without formal recognition, 
temporary marriage, polygyny, polyandry, polyamory, multi-
generational cohabiting families, or any other relationship as 
conceived by the people involved. 
Other values in addition to autonomy, such as pluralism 
and fairness, are also respected by our approach. Here, 
recognizing and validating autonomy simply expands the 
choices available to individuals, legitimizing such choice as a 
choice. At the same time, our proposal potentially alleviates 
some of the violence against women and economic 
subjugation associated with traditional marriage because 
the legal family unit will no longer rest upon dyadic 
dependency and domination. We argue not for polygamy but 
for the woman’s right to choose polygamy or any other 
household arrangement she sees fit for her. What might be 
called “out possibilities” available to women will lessen 
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dependency. If, as we argued above, exploitation is incidental 
to polygamy and other relationships, it can be policed 
through criminal law and contract law, which shows its 
inherent concern with social norms, fairness, and inequality 
through doctrines such as the duty of good faith, and 
defenses such as unconscionability. Accordingly, regulation 
or prohibition of the various relationship possibilities is 
redundant, over-inclusive, and violates the paramount 
principles of political liberalism and autonomy. Otherwise, 
the choice to marry remains “only [a] Hobson’s choice, ‘that 
or none,’”208 rather than a meaningful choice among 
alternatives. 
Restricting a woman’s autonomy and freedom of contract 
imposes a detriment on women under the guise of protecting 
them from exploitation when alternative protective 
measures are available. Not all men and women relate to 
marriage in the same way. Rather than making 
presumptions based on the sanctity of two-person marriage, 
presumptions are instead warranted in favor of the 
competence of people who are exercising their right to self-
determination by making thoughtful and informed decisions. 
To that end, pertaining to intimate contracts, participants 
must be given the (economic) choice not to marry, as well as 
a meaningful array of options if they do choose to “marry.” 
One’s choice here should not affect whatsoever one’s 
privileged relation to the State. 
Under various contracts defenses, one of the ways a 
party can show that a contract was not voluntarily entered 
is to show that he or she had no meaningful choice but to 
enter the contract—a “Hobson’s choice.” This can result from 
a threat by the other party, as with duress,209 or because the 
thing contracted for was, for example, a necessity and there 
 
 208.  MILL, supra note 33, at 51. 
 209. Under the defense of duress, a contract is unenforceable if “a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that 
leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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was only one available seller, as with unconscionability.210 
Thus, in order for consent to be voluntary, parties must 
generally enter the contract of their own free will, with 
meaningful options, including the option of walking away 
from the contract. The existing marriage contract violates 
this basic principle of contract law. 
Choice must, of course, be real, and based on paramount 
contract principles—participants must engage in private 
agreements voluntarily and without coercion. In this Section, 
we set out to show that the existing state-sponsored 
marriage contract is based on veiled economic coercion and 
the lack of other meaningful alternatives. 
First, the State gives such large economic incentives to 
marry211 that a rational economic actor has no economic 
choice (unless he or she is sufficiently wealthy) but to 
marry.212 Requiring marriage as a means of receiving 
government benefits and protections artificially restricts 
private decisions and behavior regarding intimate relations, 
making marriage effectively “compulsory,”213 rather than 
freely chosen. Indeed, if given the economic choice, some 
couples would undoubtedly choose not to marry, because of, 
for example, the traditional norms and trappings of that 
institution, the hetero-normative implications, or the general 
government control over family.214 Across her published 
works, Professor Robson argues that matrimony, like 
 
 210. A contract is generally unenforceable due to unconscionability where 
there is the “absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party.” Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
 211. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also Zalesne, supra note 
137, at 1036–37. 
 212. See supra Section II(A)(1). 
 213. Robson, supra note 18, at 314 (2009) (arguing that “marriage is a political 
institution” and that “the desire or choice to marry” should be “open to question”). 
 214. See Robson, supra note 17, at 712 (noting that “marriage implicates 
serious and insoluble problems of equality”). 
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heterosexuality, may not be a “preference at all but 
something that has had to be imposed, managed, organized, 
propagandized, and maintained by force.”215 
Then, if individuals “choose” to marry because of 
financial necessity or because it is economically wise to do so, 
they in effect have no meaningful choice when the State 
mandates that marriage be between two people. A choice is 
not a true choice where there are no other options. Such 
“coercive aspects of the phenomenon of marriage”216 
delegitimize the “choice.” Of course, individuals or couples 
are free to reject the single, default, state-sanctioned terms, 
but only at the expense of equal access to a variety of 
economic benefits. 
To legitimize the significance of the two-person marriage 
option and to recognize the rich variety of possible 
alternative relationships and the wide array of possible 
conceptions of the good life, polygamy, polyamory, and other 
alternative relationships should be available as options. If 
the choice to legally marry is made without other State-
recognized household options, and without the true economic 
option not to marry, then choice is illusory and marriage 
success rates should be expected to be low. 
Accepting the notion that intimate agreements must be 
compatible with respect for autonomy, the question remains 
whether a polygamous relationship, including one that 
develops based on gender hierarchies, can ever actually be 
based on autonomy and consent. Is such a marital hierarchy 
“inextricable from a larger system of oppression, such that it 
is impossible to consider it as freely chosen and untainted by 
injustice?”217 Certainly if that were the case, then it would be 
meaningless to offer such relationships only to then regulate 
 
 215. Id. at 780 (internal citation omitted); Robson, supra note 18, at 313 
(internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). 
 216. Robson, supra note 17, at 746. 
 217. Elizabeth Brake, Equality and Non-Hierarchy in Marriage: What do 
Feminists Really Want?, in AFTER MARRIAGE, supra note 19, at 109. 
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and ultimately prohibit each and every instance of them. We 
attempt to show, however, that it is not the case. 
To presume a woman is unable to grant consent to a non-
monogamous union presumes that polygamous and 
polyamorous relationships inherently involve men who use 
greater social power to exploit vulnerable women. It 
presumes all women have a natural monogamous mating 
instinct that would prevent them from ever voluntarily 
choosing otherwise. The presumptions are based on the 
fundamental premise that absent a religious or financial 
motive, women would not choose non-monogamous 
relationships, unless they were being exploited. This set of 
presumptions tends to be predicated on the market’s 
valuation of monogamy and social expectations that 
marriage is between two people, rather than on actual 
preferences borne out by empirical and statistical evidence. 
The presumptions buy into deep-seeded but untested 
cultural values and severely undermine women’s autonomy 
and contractual freedom. 
Culturally speaking, a more modern conception of 
polyamory is more likely to be seen as arising from full 
consent than a polygamous relationship. Indeed, the notion 
that men are the only ones asking for extramarital partners 
is not completely true. OpenMinded.com, a site for people 
looking for open relationships, surveyed over 64,000 couples 
registered to use the site, and discovered that “[o]f the 
couples engaging in open relationships, two-thirds of them 
say it was the woman’s idea.”218 This contradicts the 
argument that women are often unwilling and coerced 
participants of polyamory. 
Indeed, there are many legitimate reasons, not involving 
coercion, that a woman might choose an alternative marriage 
relationship. Women may choose non-monogamous 
 
 218. Ian Lang, Survey Finds Women More Likely to Propose Open 
Relationships, ASKMEN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://uk.askmen.com/news/dating 
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relationships to avoid the limitations that often come with 
conventional marriage. “Free love rejected the tyranny of 
conventional marriage, and particularly how it limited 
women’s lives to child-bearing, household drudgery, legal 
powerlessness, and, often enough, loveless sex.”219 
Women might also be steering away from monogamous 
relationships because of the effects on their sex drive. Per 
conventional wisdom, women are more likely to want a 
monogamous relationship because they seek emotional 
connections, while men simply want sex. However, research 
has shown that “women’s libidos tend to nose-dive when they 
are in a long-term relationship, but the same is not true for 
men.”220 While a decreased libido might seem to make 
monogamy easier for women, overall, sex experts believe that 
a diminished sex drive is not actually a healthy state for 
women.221  
Finally, some women might be willing to relinquish 
power in the relationship in exchange for access to a higher 
standard of living. It is thought, for example, that, “[s]ome 
Mormon women consider polygamy a solution to such 
difficulties as single motherhood, poverty, loneliness and 
work/family conflicts.”222 Deborah Rhode notes that among 
some African-American women, “man sharing,” as another 
example, is considered a route to family stability in 
communities where high rates of imprisonment and 
unemployment have created a shortage of potential 
 
 219. Libby Copeland, Making Love and Trouble, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:51 
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 221. Id. (noting that “women are losing their desire to initiate sex or to have 
sex with their partners, which does not reflect sexual health”). 
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husbands.223 
Given that intimate contracts, household formation, and 
dissolution planning are private affairs and supremely 
personal, the State should not involve itself in the terms and 
conditions of such family planning but for its legitimate role 
in preventing unconscionable family contracts. By analogy to 
contract law, the State’s role is to enforce the private 
contracts that free and autonomous persons choose to create. 
For the State to recognize versions of household constitution 
that it favors and fail to enforce, even criminalize, contracts 
that it disfavors, is to trample on autonomy and exclude 
forms of life. Instead, a paradigmatic shift in the law from 
marriages to households respects both autonomy and 
diversity, while the freedom of the individual is honored in 
the provision of a range of choice within a laissez-faire 
approach to deeply personal, intimate relations. 
 
II. FROM MARRIAGES TO HOUSEHOLDS: RESPECT FOR 
MEANINGFUL CHOICE 
Today, a majority of families in the United States can 
now be considered what historically has been “non-
traditional,” including unmarried cohabitating couples,224 
same-sex couples,225 single-parent households,226 and 
 
 223. Id. at 123. 
 224. The number of non-married heterosexual couples has been increasing 
rapidly, and the numbers are predicted to continue escalating. Cynthia Grant 
Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual Cohabitation, 
9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 34 (2007). 
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extended-family households,227 as well as older parents.228 
Consistent with this trend is the rise of non-monogamous 
intimate relationships and arrangements, including 
relationships involving more than two people. Sexually non-
monogamous couples in the United States number in the 
millions.229 Although the lack of a single definition for who 
counts as “polyamorous” makes determining how many of 
those people are “poly” a bit more difficult, the general trends 
toward greater tolerance in family formations are clear and 
are unlikely to reverse course any time soon. 
Multigenerational family living (a household that 
includes two or more adult generations) is also common and 
on the rise. In 2016, according to a new Pew Research Center 
analysis of census data, a record 64 million Americans or 
20% of the United States population lived in 
multigenerational households.230 Though there are very few 
statistics, there are also various forms of intimate, nonsexual 
partnerships. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that 
intimate (nonsexual) partnerships take the form of platonic 
parenting (married people who end their love-based 
marriage but who choose to stay together to raise the 
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children)231 and people (oftentimes gay men or women) who 
decide to raise a child with a friend.232 
The solution we propose, in order to accommodate these 
alternative arrangements and respect autonomy, is to treat 
marriage as a contract like any other. Reflecting the existing 
social reality regarding marriage and intimate relationships, 
we offer a new legal category meant to supplant marriage 
that we call households, which identifies a unit of people that 
has chosen to enter a contractual relationship. The 
contractual household, rather than marriage status, would 
serve as the general, non-parochial unit of people relevant to 
state policymaking. As already built into the law of contracts, 
in order to show consent to a household, the relationship 
must be entered voluntarily, with full capacity, and without 
undue influence, duress, or unconscionability. 
The concept and empirical reality of various types of 
households are compatible with our vision of political 
liberalism and State neutrality articulated above in that the 
household is the most primary or general unit encompassing 
sub-arrangements worth contracting for and is due equal 
state recognition and treatment. The household is the 
common genus over and above monogamous, polygamous, 
and polyamorous marriages, as well as over intimate 
friendships, sibling and inter-generational child raising, or a 
flat of bachelors. State equal treatment and recognition of 
households threatens no basic principles of political 
liberalism and State neutrality. 
Business partnerships offer a legal model for 
households.233 We take from the “business” element the 
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notion that the State need not interfere with the private 
activity of free individuals pursuing their own ends. We take 
from “partnership” the notion that each participant’s 
voluntary contribution to the association is based on trust 
among all that “we’re in this together.” 
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (UPA) defines a 
partnership as “an association of two or more persons to 
carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . .”234 There are 
no formalities to become a partnership, though parties can 
enter a partnership agreement defining the contours of the 
relationship. Importantly, partnership law does not limit 
partnerships to two people.235 Similarly, with households, 
the parties themselves would define who is a member of the 
household, with no limits on the number of participants. 
Households would replace marriages in receiving the State 
allocated benefits traditionally provided to married couples. 
Though our justification for the household paradigm is 
lengthy, our definition of households is intentionally brief 
because the concept is as open-ended as a contract. We 
envision households encompassing associations of various 
types. Some may pertain to childcare, others to single sisters’ 
sororities. Our proposed framework would allow for the 
formation of communal families not dependent on romantic 
love, but also undoubtedly compatible with it, as business 
partners may be either life-long friends or strangers. 
This framework would also separate marriage from 
parenting. Professors Brennan and Cameron make the case 
for thinking about “children as a possible basis for family 
building, outside the aegis of marriage or even romantic 
love.”236 Separating marriage from parenting (“free standing 
 
person marital model, see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, 
Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010). 
 234. Sec. 6 (Partnership Defined). 
 235. See id. While partnerships do require two or more people, sole 
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 236. Samantha Brennan & Bill Cameron, Is Marriage Bad for Children? 
Rethinking the Connection Between Having Children, Romantic Love, and 
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parenting”) can be viewed as a panacea for various issues in 
family law, including the problems arising from 
“illegitimate” children, divorce, intestacy, and other issues. 
This way, a child may have two “legal parents” for the 
relevant purposes, but the parents could be married to each 
other and a third person, married separately, or any other 
agreed upon combination. As foreign as this may seem, it is 
already the reality given the ever-growing divorce rate237 
and growing number of children born out of wedlock.238 The 
prevailing policy of tying marriage to parenthood denies 
social reality. 
We propose our vision and the rough paradigm—not a 
comprehensive doctrine—because we understand there are 
potential pitfalls that require attention. For example, what 
result if twenty people desire to register as a household and 
demand health care from the employer of one member of the 
household? Such an incidental unwelcome consequence 
might require reform of the entire health care system (long 
overdue) by, for instance, taking the employer role out of the 
healthcare system altogether. How precisely to address such 
a difficult broader question is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Likewise, as marriage becomes more complicated, so 
too, inevitably, does divorce. But continuing with the 
partnership analogy, dissolution of associations of large 
numbers of people is not impossible. The difficult question of 
dissolution of a household is also beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
History has proven that marriage customs continually 
evolve. As non-monogamous unions become more attractive, 
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their forms will evolve into more acceptable dynamics. In 
other words, the normatively idealized forms of life 
associated with these names will be refined and more widely 
socially tolerated. For example, legal polygamy “could be 
structured in [a] way[] similar to civil monogamy, so that [its] 
impact on gender equality and marital privacy would be, at 
worst, neutral and, at best, empowering for all involved.”239 
The most effective and efficient way for the law to keep 
pace with changing “family values” is through contract. 
Because family and intimate relationships are highly unique 
and individual, they often do not fit within the limitations of 
government regulations, and may be more functionally 
structured through contracts. Families that do not fit the 
traditional mold should not have to wait for government 
approval to attain status equivalent to their married 
counterparts. Instead, such partners should be able to secure 
their rights and status through state recognition. 
Recognition of family arrangements through contract is 
consistent with cultural and legal momentum, as attitudes 
regarding marriage continue to evolve. Expanding “family” 
to include the broader array of possibilities of a household 
achieves these goals. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The approach to marriage and the law articulated in this 
Article, positing the moral and legal permissibility of non-
monogamous marriage, is part of a growing awareness in the 
academy of the coercive, exclusive, restrictive, parochial, and 
illiberal features of the prevailing policy. Ruthann Robson’s 
article, Compulsory Matrimony, makes the case that because 
“U.S. economic policies foster and subsidize the economics of 
marriage,” it follows that “the present legal regime operates 
as one of the forces that ‘organize’ and ‘manage’ people’s 
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‘choice’ whether or not to marry.”240 We claim additionally 
that while the state should not involve itself in the choice to 
marry, it must also not involve itself in the choice among 
marriages. Jeremy Garrett argues for a position called 
“marital contractualism,” explaining that the State has not 
justified its policy of marriage regulation.241 Instead, the 
contract paradigm protects: (1) efficiency; (2) equality [state 
neutrality]; (3) diversity; and (4) informed consent.242 
Finally, Adrienne Davis advocates for the business 
partnership model as a workable, precedential solution.243 
Perhaps ironically, our approach to marriage and 
household formation may likely have the consequence of a 
golden age of monogamous marriage. The choice to marry 
one person till death under our proposed legal framework 
would regain that magical significance. No longer the dry, 
default choice, choosing monogamy among alternative 
arrangements affirms the unadulterated two-person 
romantic union because in such a case, monogamous 
marriage is cherished for its inherent value from the point of 
view of the participants, not the State. 
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America, he found 
small associations of different forms and creeds flourishing 
alongside each other. He spoke to representatives of as many 
as he could and found that they: 
agreed with each other except about details; all thought that the 
main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their country was 
the complete separation of church and state. I have no hesitation in 
stating that throughout my stay in America I met nobody, lay or 
 
 240. Robson, supra note 18, at 316. 
 241. JEREMY GARRETT, A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST CIVIL MARRIAGE (2009). 
See also Elizabeth Brake, Marriage and Domestic Partnership, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July. 11, 2009), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries 
/marriage/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2016). 
 242. Brake, supra note 240. 
 243. Davis, supra note 232, at 2002–04. 
2018] FROM MARRIAGE TO HOUSEHOLDS 977 
cleric, who did not agree about that.244 
Monogamy, similarly, may just as well flourish under the 
separation of church and the marriage paradigm in an 
authentically liberal State. 
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